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ABSTRACT

PHILOSOPHY AND ENVIRONMENTAL c,RISrS:
FOUNDATION FOR ~EW TECHNOLOGICAL PARADIGM
DAVll5 M. RICE
This work is meant to provide an analysis of some of the
basic philosophical considerations which will have to be made
in order to effect the favorable resolution of an environmental
crisis.
I begin by defining what I mean by "environmental crisis"
and what the evidence for the existence of such a crisis seems
to be, though I draw no conclusions here.

I examine also the

concept of the "technological myth," that is, the belief that
alllhuman problems can be solved by increased technology alone.
The main thesis of the work is the need for a new
IItechnological paradigm. II

This is based on-::.the assumption that

applied science will be necessary for the solution to environmental
crisis but that the basic issue is one of determining how to
direct technology.
f1

This new paradigm must, therefore, be a

v alue ll paradigm, for only human values can direct human behavior;

science alone being "descriptive" rather than

II

prescriptive."

This new paradigm must consist of our most basic existing moral
values, those values which most or all of us hold to be the
most important.
Since environmental crisis is primarily a threat to those
unborn. such a crisis can probably only have meaning for us
if we have reason to honor the interests of

tu~ure

generations.

Therefore, I examine first of all why such an obligation seems
absent for modern man, but conclude that without an apparent
threat we simply have not been called upon yet to exercise our
responsibilities.

I attempt to analyze our obligation to

posterity in terms of even more "basic" considerations: Iljustice,1I

1I1ove, 11

11

immortali ty ,II and the

0

bllgation to our children.

The remainder of the paper is devoted to exploring what Bome
of our basic obligations to future generations are.

First and

foremost is probably the need to ensure the su»vival, the pure
physical existence, of mankind.

Any moral principle which

pertains to future human circumstances is only reasonable if
it includes the existence of moral agents for whom the principle
has meaning.

In order to ensure the satisfaction of future

obligations, we must plan on a timescale sufficient to ensure
th~t

short-term self-interest values do not conflict with our

paradigmatic moral obligations.

Science tells' -us what we can

and can not do in terms of alternative futures, though human
values determine the final decision.

Because of the difficulty

in long-range planning there is a threat of lIoverplanning,"
planning on the basis of too many unknown variables.

Consequently,

probably only those moral values which we hold most dear ought
to

be~"planned

for over the very long term.

Finally, we must

ensure that our moral obligations to future generations are
instilled into modern society.

Dissemination of more information

will help, but morals themselves will probably have to be
reinforced legally because of man's individual inability to act
for long-range moral interests.

Theoretically, those with the

strongest moral sense ought to rule, thOUgh I recognize the
inherent danger of political abuse.
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Introduction
ON

TI!!

NATURE

Qf

AN ,;;;;EN~V;;;..;IR~O;;.;;N~ME=N .....
T_AL_

CRI SIS

One finds today considerable reference to situations
of "crisis: tr political crisis, economic crisis, religious
crisis, etc.

In most such cases, however, the situations

being refered to are merely those in which a person or
party (otten political) forsees an unwelcome change in
the status quo.

The intention in using the term "crisis"

here, thUS, is usually to elicit an aversive response in
order that the change be avoided and the eXisting state
of affairs be preserved.

lICrisis" in these situations

mayor may not ultimately involve change.

"Threat" is

perhaps a better word to use here.
I propose to use a stronger definition of the term
"crisis,"

st~onger

in the sense of greatly limiting the

number of entities which we would want to call "crises. 1I
"Crisis,lI for the purposes of this paper, will refer to
situations in which change is unavoidable; there can be
no continuance of the status quo.

A crisis is a turning

point for Jlbetter" or Itworse,1I threatening something which
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is held to be very precious.

Unlike many threats, however,

ignoring the situation can not make the threat go away.
In fact, ignoring a crisis can only make things worse.
Something else considered to be valuable must always be
sacrificed in order to resolve a crisis for the better.
To face a crisis is to approach a fork in the road by
which we may veer right or left, the only thing certain
being that we cannot continue straight ahead.

Is there,

then, such an "environmental ll crisis and what might be
the penalty for ignoring it?
It is common to hear today of tithe environment. II
Properly understood, can the term "environment" really
be used coherently as a simple nouni in and of itself?
How would most persons probably go about defining lithe
environment?"

They would probably begin by listing

compnnents such as trees, mountains, clouds, ants, etc.
Then, would it not be fair to inquire whether these persons
might not be equating " envirol'Ulll9ilt" with "nature?ll

But,

without further qUalification, "environment" and "nature"
are not necessarily aynonomous, at least for practical
purposes.

"Naturel! can clearly be used as a noun; the

term refera to something which is probably intelligible
in and of itself. Ail.
something.

lI

environJBe.lltl! ia an environment of

It is "the circumstances, objects, e.r conditions ll1

in which something is to be found.
for us in terms of its environment.

An entity gains meaning

The more of its
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environment we are familiar with, the more about it we
know.

Since ecologists tell us that e?erything is involved

in an intricate, interrelated web of cause and effect

(Barry Commoner: !!Everything is connected to everything
else. 1I2 ). there is perhaps Bome sense in which we can

In tha.t sense.

speak of "the environment" as "nature."

in order to really "knowll something we would have to know
everything, whatever that might mean.

Generally, though}

we are satisfied to know as much as possible about the most
immediate and influential aspects of an object's environment,
to the extent that these relate to our purpose for wanting
to know about that object in the first place.

In order to become familiar with "the environmental
crisis,1I then, it becomes necessary to stipulate the
entity whose environment we are concerned with.

I

think

that most people would agree that we are concerned first
and foremost with the environment of man.

There are

certainly incidents of concern for the environment of
the bald eagle for the bald eagle's sake or for the
environment of the African elephant for the sake of the
African elephant} even among human beings.

Nevertheless.

it is probably safe to say that for most of us concern
for the general interests of any other species will
probably be overridden by concern for the general interests
of mankind, if a real conflict should arise.* The
*****
* This is not to say that the general interests of other
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environmental crisis, as commonly refered to, is primarily
a human crisis, a crisis caused by the way man affects and
1s affected by certain aspects of his environment.
Any human problem, not purely existential in nature,
can probably be refered to as "environmental. 1I

Nevertheless,

the environmental crisis," as that term is standardly used,

~

can normally be subdivided into three major problem areas.
These would be: 1) overpopulation, 2) depletion of natural
resources, and 3) pollution.

These catagories are quite

obviously interrelated and anyone can probably not be
SUfficiently understood without an adequate understanding
of the other two.

Nevertheless,

each one separately.

~

shall briefly review

In addition, I shall add a fourth

which, though not always included in this list, perhaps
threatens the most serious environmental catastrophe.
I am ref.ring to the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
SpeCUlations on the dangers of overpopulation on a
global scale are as old as Thomas Robert Malthus (1766
1834). based on very simple principles:

That population cannot increase without the
means of subsistence 1s a proposition so evident
that it needs no illustration.
That population does invariably increase
where there are the means of subsistence, the
history o~ every people that have ever existed
will prove.

*****

species need necessarily conflict with the general interests
of mankind. Indeed I think that ought rarely to be the
case, though it is, of course, at the present time.
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And that the superior power of population
cannot be checked without producing misery or
vice, the ample portion of these too bitter
ingrediants in the cup of human life and the
continuance of the physical causes that seem to
have p:roduced them" bear too convincing a
testimony.3
Modern techno'logy has d,one much to stave off massive
starvation in much of the world) including the miraculous
results of the [).att:aD day "Green Revolution. 1I

Nevertheless,

population continues to grow at an alarming rate
The Limits

12

80

that

Grewth, researched by a team of M.l.T.

scientists aided by a computer, can

prophes~~

that:

For the moment we can safely conclude that
because of the delays in the controlling
feedback loops, especially the positive loop
of births, there is no possibility of leveling
off the population growth curve before the
year 2000, even with the most optimistic
assumption of decreasing fertility. Most
prospective parents of the year 2000 have
already been born. Unless there is a sharp
rise in mortality, which mankind will certainly
striTe mightily to avoid, we can look forward
to a world population ot around 7 billion persons
in 30 more year8. And if we continue to su~ed
in lowering mortality with no better success in
lowering fertility than we have accomplished
in the past, in 60 years there will be four
people in the world for every one person liVing
today.4
Canvthis many people be adequately fed, clothed, and
sheltered, not to mention having
wastes disposed of?

th~rnatural

and unnatural

Even more, can we possibly expect to

provide an exploding population with a standard of living
which we as Americans consider at least "humane" and for
which the underdeveloped world is screaming; housing,
ele ctrici ty, plumbing" automobiles, etc.?

This cannot

~
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fully understood unless contemplated in the light of the
next

paragrap~but

I think that it is safe to agree with

William Ophuls when he states:
In sum, although the specific terms of the food
population calculus have changed since Malthus
first put forward his "dismal theorem" in 1798,
the prospects for a species whose fertility
continues to outrun its means of sustenance is
atill~unrelievedly diBmal. 5
Depletion of natural resources has probably been the
most

notewD~thy

recent years.

environmental issue for Americana in

The Bo-called lIenergy crisis ll has

demonstrated that we cannot necessarily go on treating
all of our mineral resources as if they were endless or
unlimited.

It is ultimately not dollars but the sun and

earth which provide energy, and that may not be as much
as we want.

Ophula sums up the results of a systems

analysis exploring the availability of mineral resources:
The case is clear. Almost halt the static
reserves are less than 100 years, the average
growth rate is about 3 percent, the doubling
time is 23 years, and the exponential reserve
figures indicate that just over half of these
major minerals will be exhausted in less than
50 years at current growth rates. 6
This is not to mention the so-called '!t'enewable resources,1I
such as forests and wildlife, and most importantly food.
Konrad Lorenz, 1n a critique of modern man, reveals that:.
The farmer knows Bom,ething that the w.hole of
civilized mankind se'ems to have forgotten, namely,
that the resources of life on our planet are not
inexhaustible~ In tbe United states, it was only
after wide expanses 'of plowland had been eroded
through ruthless exp,loi taticm of the top soil,
after-large districts had been devastated by
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timbering, and countless useful animal species
had become extinct that these facts gradually
began to be realized again, particularly because
many large agricul teal..,. fishing, and wha.ling
industries began to fe-el the effects financially.
Nevertheless, the truth has only begun to penetrate
to the consciousness of the general public.- f
Isn't it perhaps time to worry about what some of these
rising prices might really signify?
Pollution, rea.lly, is simply another form of resource
depletion, though while we could survive without iron ore
or crudeooil (theoretically, at least) we certainly could
not survive without clean air, water, and soil.

In recent

years, in particular, man has desecrated his own environment
to the extent of making large segments of it useless or
even dangerouB

to himself.

The environment can simply

not absorb everything we might want to put into it.

Rachel

Carson was one of the first to make this a genuine aspect
of the twentieth century consciousness.

Her book Silent

Spring, a polemic on the modern use of herbicides and
insecticides, states:
How could intelligent beings seek to control a
few unwanted species by a method that contaminated
the entire environment and brought the threat of
disease and death even to their own kind?~
The fact we have to realize is that we ultimately must live
in our own mess if the environment is unable to dispose of
it.

Much of the increase in po11ution is due to the

increase in

population~

more demand requires more

technological output creating more pollution.

However,
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many of the most serious pollution problems are in the
United States, a country not particularly heavily populated
by relative world standards.

Barry Commoner explains:

The chief reason for the environmental crisis
that has engulfed the United States in re~ent
years i . the Bweeping transformation of
productive technology since World War II.
The economy has grown enough to give the
Uni ted State's population about the same amount
of basic goods, per capita, as it did in 1946.
However, productive technologies with intense
impacts on the environment have displaced lesa
destructive ones. The environmental crisis is
the inevitab~e result of this counterecological
pattern of growth.9
The pollution process is further complicated by a time
lag factor, making it difficult to predict the future
effects of present day pollution.

~

Limits to GrGWth

explains that:
This ignorance about the limits of the earth's
ability to absorb pollutants should be reason
enough for caution in the release of polluting
substances. The danger of reaching those limits
is especially great because there 1s typically a
long delay between the release of a pollutant
into the environment and the appea~ance of its
negative effect on the ecosystem. 10
One can only

imagin~

what might happen if this "counter

ecological pattern of growth" were spread to the
under-developed world with its massive population.
All three of these environmental problems have at
least one factor in common.

They all

invoi~e

growth,

an increase in the quantity of people, products, and waste.
In most cases, the

g~owth

of growth itself is involved.

This is called "exponential" growth: itA quantity exhibits
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exponential growth when it increases by a constant percentage
of the whole in a constant time period."11

Accelerated

growth causes social problems of its own but the real
"environmental crisis" of which I

have been speaking

occurs when limits to growth are encountered.

Resource

and absorption demand cannot be greater than the
environment's capacity to provide such.

If the earth is

essentially finite it would seem that in the face of
increasing demand that the earth must eventually run
out.

If that is indeed what is now happening we are surely

in grave peril: in fact we are in crisis.

We have become

dependent upon a growing economy while much of the world
is still trapped in

~iraling

population growth.

If we

allow the earth's limits to be reached serious consequences
will certainly follow.
Those consequences are often speculated in great
detail but they all point to the same thing, the collapse
of human civilization.

As

~

Limits to Growth summarizes:

"The basic behavior mode of the world system is exponential
growth ofrJpopulation and capital, folloW1!d by collapse. II 12
Collapse will be, aside from anything else, at least the
end of those modes of growth upon which much of our present
day civilization is based.

The Limits to Growth can thus

conclude:
We can thUB say with Bome confidence that, under
the assumption of no major change in the present
system, population and industrial growth will
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certainly stop within the next century, at the
latest. 15
Blueprint

f2!

Survival, based upon the findings of

Limits to Growth, paints the possible consequences

~
o~

an environmental crisis in a little more detail, taking
heed

o~

the fact that a crisis is not necessarily a

hopeless situation:
The principal defect of the industrial way of
life with its ethos of expansion is that it is
not sustainable. Its termination within the
lifetime of someone born ~oday is inevitable
unless it continues to be sustained for a while
longer by an entrenched minority~at the cost of
imposing great suffering on the rest of mankind.
We can be certain, however, that sooner or later
it will end (only the precise time and circumstances
are in doubt), and that it will do~n one of two
ways: either against our will, in a succession of
famines, epidemics, social crises, and wars, or
in the way we want it to- because we wish to
create a society that will not impose hardship
and_cruelty upon our children- in a successi~~
of thoughtful, humane, and measured change s •
Note the inevitability of change characteristic of a crisis
situation.

If the future of mankind is allowed to take

a turn for the worse that change will involve massive
death, probably societal chaos for any still living, along
with the ultimate possibility of total human extinction.
A conscious effort to avoid collapse may offer us in the
future an improved quality of life, though that quality
will not consist in the number of material
owned or the number of children reared.

possesskins~

To be aware of

an environmental crisis and not choose tor a better future
is most certainly to choose for collapse.
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Yet there are those who explicitely deny the existence
of an environmental crisis.

How 1s this possible?

Few

responsible persons would deny that the environmental
problems to which I have
degree, exist.

re~ered

do not, at least to some

Likewise, noone can reasonably deny that

we live on a finite planet.

The earth is a sphsre with a

fixed diameter encased by an atmosphere of varying but
limited thickness.

~naw!ore

any resources possessed by

the earth are there in a fixed quantity.

The debate does

not center around the validity of these facts but around
their meaning and importance.
Despite these facts

an

author such as John Maddox,

writer of fhe Doomsday Syndrome, expresses the opinion
that:
•.• in spite of the pace with which resources
are now being exploited, it is a telling
paradox that the present seems to be a time
when materials are becoming economically more
plentiful, not more scarce. Techniques for
exploration for and extraction of metals seems
to have kept ahead of scarcity. 15
Unless the question of finite resources is entirely ignored,
which has been the general policy until very recently,
anti-environmental crisis arguments of the type Maddox
proposes tend to take one of two positions.

They may extend

the timespan before which the majority of our vital resources
become scarce so as to make worrying about it as absurd
as worrying about the draining of the sun.

Persons of

this persuasion tend to argue for the existence of vast
amounts of undiscovered resources.

As economists they
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tell us that as scarce resources become prohibitively
expensive it will become profitable to utilize resources
which otherwise would not have been feasible.

In addition,

improved technology will not only make the utilization of
these raw materials more efficient but will also control
pollution.

There are also arguments that the population

explosion is beginning to reverse itself as fertility rates
begin to drop, making use of difficulties in accurately
predicting future population

trend~admitted

by

Commoner

himself:
The scientific evidence regarding the future
course of world population growth is by no means
unambiguous or conclusive. Any conclusion relevant
to the future represents an extrapolation from
past trends. Depending on the past data that are
chosen as a ~~se. strikingly different extrapolations
can be made.
The other solution to our present environmental
problems utilizes the traditional concept of the new
frontier.

With most of the earth becoming inhabited

and exploited the most reasonable response} for this group)
is to make use of resources beyond our own atmosphere.
The proponents of this theory envisage mining the planets
and constructing huge space stations to be placed in orbit
around the earth or sun.

A limitless population could be

supported. the standard of living could continue to increase
with an expanding economy, and waste products could simply
be pumped into space.

According to this group, what was

science fiction for our parents is reality today.

Why
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couldn't this trend continue?

Both this and the economic

argument are supported by learned and responsible men and
certainly ought not to be ignored.
But there is another group with less faith in the
ability of modern civilization to deal with environmental
problems.

As Maddox refers to this group:

Prophets of doom nave multiplied remarkably in
the past ~ew years. It used to be commonplace
for men to parade city streets with sandwich
boards proclaiming lIThe End of the World Is at
Hand!" They have been replaced by a throng of
sober people. scientists. philosophers and
politicians, proclaiming that there are mo~e
subtle calamities just around the corner. 1"(
This group i8 also composed of learned and responsible men.
All rebuttals directed to those who would deny environmental
crisis rest primarily on the argument that those persons
have been deluded by a"technological myth."

John Black

writes:
To attempt to find an answer to the present
ecological crisis in terms of more and improved
technological intervention is illusory. It may
solve this crisis, perhaps the next and the few
following ones, but it tails to recognize that
the situation arises directly from our attitude
to the world and what we are to do with it.
Improving the means of interfering with natural
processes may alleviate the worstexcesses of our
civilization as a temporary measure. but the greater
our powers of interventien, the greater the risk
of final breakdown. 18
liThe technological myth ll performs a fallacy ot composition;
what was previously true may no longer apply to the present
situation.

Subscribers to the technological myth place

their faith in human technology which has solved most
of our major problems in the past and ought, therefore,
to continue solving most of our major problems in the
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future, including environmental problems.

Man is an

inveterate problem solver and has Bolved almost every
serious problem to date, aided by technology.
he not continue to do so?
the"doomsdayer~·

Why should

This is analogous, according to

to my stating that because I have overcome

all sickness in my life to date that I shall, of course,
live forever.

The analogy is not perfect for while the

human body must eventually die we hope that humarn:civilization
need not.

Nevertheless, the point is clear.

There is no

reason to believe that technology will circumvent environ
mental crisis.

Indeed modern technology adds to the chance

of environmental crisis, gobbling up resources and spewing
out waste.

The Limits 1£ Growth shows that increased

technology alone will not avert

colla~se:

We have shown that in the world model the
application of technology to apparent problems
of resource ,depletion or pollution or food
shortage has no im'pact on the essential problem,
which is exponential growth in a finite and
complex s~Btem. Our attempts to use eIen the
most oppt~mistic _estimates of the benefits of
technology in the model did not prevent the
ultimate decline of population and industry,
and in fact did not in any cas~9Postpone the
collapse beyond the year 2100.
The new space frontier is probably not an answer either
simply because o,f the -IDassi ve amount of resources such
an undertaking would require, especially at

a

time when

Americans ar'e reluctant to put dollars into the space
program as it now exists.

Even if such a program were

feasible now it is likely that by the time mankind came
to realize ~~s predicament on earth it would no longer
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be an option.

c..rr&tt Hardin is probably correct when

he says:
We spent something like $30 billion to get to the
moon, ?39,OOO miles away. It was a magnificent
technological achievement. But in the end, the
principle product 01 the Space program may prove
to be a ,deepened understanding of our s1 tuation
here on earth. We may come at last to feel in our
bones that the earth is truly finite, and no~very
tig at that; and that ~B must learn to use it
without destroying it.
Certainly we cannot
point.

do~~ithout

technology; that is not the

Better birth control procedures and more efficient

resource utilization and pollution oontrol, among other
things, are surely needed.

But that alone, as The Limits

to Growth pointed out, is not enough to avoid ultimate
collapse.

We must come nto feel in our bones" that the

earth and her resources are indeed limited.
What makes the environmental crisis even more dangerous,
whether or not the doomsdayers are premature concerning the
ultimate limitations within which we have to live, are the
dangers which simple

sho~t

range scarcity and localized

over-population can bring to the

j·r.~lationshlps

human environment or civilization.

wi thin our

Inequality in the

distribution of presently available resources is a

fac~

as expressed by Lester Brown in World Without Borders:
In effect, our world today is in reality two
worlds, one rich, one poor; oue literate, one
largely illiterate; one industrial,and urban,
one agrarian and rural; one overfed1and overweight,
one hungry and malnourished; one affluent and
consumption-oriented, one poverty-stricken and
survival-oriented. 21
Despite claims to the contrary, this situation on the
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worldwide level is not getting any
in The Limits

1£

bette~

as pointed out

Growth:

Since industrial output is growing at 7 percent
per year and population only at 2 percent per year,
it might appear that dominant positive feedback
loops are a cause for rejoicing. Simple extrapo
lation of those growth rates would Buggest that
the material standard of living of the worldts
people will double within the next 14 years.
Such a conclusion, however, often includes the
implicit assumption that the world's growing indus
trial ou~put is evenly distributed ~ongst the
world's citizens. The fallacy of this assumption
can be appreciated when the per capita economic
grow~h ra~~s of some individual nations are
examlned.
Ultimately, in the face of the present growth rate, everyone
will lose with the advent of civilizational collapse.
Nevertheless, this inequality alone carries within it the
seeds for a much more abrupt end to modern man.
As the competition for resources becomes stiffer,
and there are already signs that this is happening, the
opportunity~for

increase.

human violence to show itself may,

to~

War 1s generally considered to be primarily a

social problem;

however~when

nuclear weapons are coupled

to this social problem the potential for an environmental
problem of catastrophic proportions arises.

The situation

is described by Barry Commoner:
There is a final threat to ecological survival
that hardly needs to be documented here-nuclear
war. A decade ago, the military and their
supporters could still pretend that victory was
possible in a nuclear war. In the face of repeated
evidence by the independent scientific community,
led by Linus PaUling and others, the pretense was
maintained for a while. No~ although the nuclear
threat to survival is acknowledged, the United
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States and presumably other nuclear powers are
in a constant state of readiness to launch a
suicidal war. 2 3
Political

sYBte~

which carry the potential for alleviating

an environmental crisis, also threaten to bring about this
ultimate catastrophe.

Not only do overpopulated, under

developed nations now possess nuclear capabilities but
even terrorist groups now, theoretically, have access to
lithe bomb. 1I

Nationalism, fostered by scarcity. may result

in mankind's terminal collapse.
~

Robert Heilbroner, in

Human Prospect tears that:
The continuing likelihood of war enters the human
prospect not alone by virtue of the life-or death
risks it offers, but also as a principal reason
for the continuation of nation-states as the
dominant mode of social organization. The latter,
in turn, gives unhappy assurance that nationalism,
with all its potential for historic calamity, will
be encouraged by the persisting realities of
international existence-the omnipresent threat of
war justifying the need for nation-states; the
presence of nation-states in turn setting the
stage for a continuance of the threat of war.
From this vi~ioUS circle there is at present
no escape •••
Robert Heilbroner opens The Human Prospect with the

question: Ills there hope for man?"
hope-,.

~o_cha1ce

for the future.

extinction might be inevitable.

Perhaps there is no

Collapse and maybe even
If, indeed, we have

reached that point we are no longer at the point of
crisis but on the

threshhold~

Perhaps this ought to be so.

of certain disaster.
We speak of our present

human civilization as being somehow "unna tural" and yet,
can this be so?

Is not one of the basic tenets of ecology

that man is a part of nature?

Therefore does it not
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follow that his actions are "natural?"

Barry Commoner's

third law of ecology is that:"Nature knows best:" IIStated
baldly, the third law of ecology holds that any major man
made change in a natural system is likely to be detrimental
to that system. u25

Nevertheless, perhaps what we consider

detrimental to a natural system or to ourselves is but a
working of nature's laws.

It may be a simple fact of nature

that man's dominion over the earth's resources is at an end.
Our demise may be "ordained," not by God but by nature.
Be that as it may, this certainly provides no principles
upon which to guide our lives.

I believe that there is

still rational hope that an environmental crisis can be
resolved to produce a better world.

At least we must act

as though there are alternatives and hope that we are
right.

This is not to mean that hope should take the

place of deliberate action.

Changes will come in a crisis

whether for the better or for the worse and as The Limits
to Growth states: "It is important to realize, however, that
the longer exponential growth is allowed to continue, the
fewer po~sibilities remain for the final stable state.,,26
In addition I agree with Nicholas Reacher that we are faced
with a totally new situation calling for a totally new
response.
~,

going back:

None of our options tor the future includes
M

I want to propose the deeply pessimistic suggestion
that, crudely speaking, the environment has had it
and that we simply cannot "go horre/again" to "the
good old days" of environmental purity. We all
know of the futile laments caused by the demise of
the feudal order by such thinkers as Thomas More
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or the ruralistic yearnings voiced by the
romantics in fue early days of the Industrial
Revolution. Historical retrospect may well cast
the present spate of hand-wringing over
environmental deterioration as an essentially
analogous-right-minded but utterly futile
penchant for the easier, simpler ways of
bygone days.27
Intelligent persons are still debating whether such
an "environmental crisis" really exists?
new to add here.

That is why I have confined my remarks

on the actual existence of
introduction.

I have nothing

an~environmental

crisis to an

Nevertheless, I begin this paper with the

assumption that an environmental crisis is a serious
possibility, which I hope I have demonstrated here.

The implications of an environmental crisis, I believe,
are simply too serious to be ignored, for we may not
know for certain whether an environmental crisis ever
existed until the consequences are upon us.
it may be too I.late.

But by then

Chapter 1

WHY THE PHILOSOPHERS?

Science, as the process of interpreting phenomena
in mutually understandable terms, or as the body of that
knowledge so stated, can not solve an environmental crisis.
In the same way that it cannot, in and of itself, formulate
the solution to an environmental crisis, science, equally,
cannot be the cause of such a crisis.
science,

80

The objects of

defined, are matters of empirical observation

and scientific method 1s the attempt, by the process of
inductive reasoning, to establish new theories or verify
existing theories of "objective reality."

Until successful,

those objects cannot be utilized for establishing further
scientific knowledge.

In short, science'describes'reality.

The corrollary to this is, therefore, that to the extent
any discipline, be it a member of the

natural,or.. so-

called, social sciences, success.: fUlly classifies empirical
data into accepted theories at reality, it is engaging in
the practiceof\~cience! The point I want to make, above
all others, is that science, of itself, is descriptive
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rather than prescriptive, attempting to describe what
really is rather than prescribe what ought to be.
I repeat, science, thus defined, cannot solve an
environmental crisis, indeed cannot solve a crisis of
any

A crisis, as pointed out earlier, refers to an

kind.

inevitable turning polnt for better or worse.

For this

reason, a scientific classification of an environmental
crisis (which is what I attempted to provide in brief
form in the introduction), while a worthwhile and even
necessary endeavor towards the resolution of that crisis,
can not and will not bring about changes in the status of
the crisis.

A solution, here, involves a decision, in

this case for the choice of and action towards a "better"
future.

A decision, here, therefore, involves prescribing

that definition and course of action.

Science, however.

as stated above, can only describe what actually is, not
prescribe what ought to be.*

John Dewey, in his Theory

2! Valuation, testifies to the fundamental problem facing
those who attempt to maintain a purely scientific stance
towards environmental issues:
••• one is at once struck by the fact that the
sciences of astronomy, physics, chemistry, etc.,
do not contain expressions that by any stretch
of the imagination can be regarded as standing
*****
* Logic, too, therefore, as a process to determine coherence
in terms of the fundamental principles of human thought,
cannot, any mor'e than science, which, indeed, utilizes the
rules of logic, prescribe what ought to be. It alone, then,
cannot provide the solution to an environmental crisis either.
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for value-facts or conceptions. But, on the
other hand, all deliberate, all planned human
conduct, personal and collective, seems to be
influenced, if not controlled, by estimates of
value or worth of ends to be attained. 1
A crisis, by definition, threatens values not scientific
facts.

This is not to say that the "facts" are not sometimes

influenced by the values but that, even for this reason in
itself, it is important~ealize that a correct understanding
of and resolution for an environmental crisis will require
dealing with human values.

The scientist can go nowhere

towards solving an environmental crisis without guidance
from the philosopher.
The firat problem is to decide what it means to be
or possess a " value. 1I
task.

As a value

This, in itself, is not an easy

theoriB~

Harold Osborne has written,

and I think rightly so, that:
••• an application o:f the principle of "dictionary"
definition showed that the rival theories about
Value embody different conceptual definitions of
different ideas and not different attempts
conceptually to define the same idea. The philo
sophers are not mistaken about the nature of the
same thing "Value", but are mistaken in thinking
that they are trying to define the same thing;
whereas the y are successfully defining different
things. 2
Being so

fore~arned,

rather than entering the arena in

a misguided attempt to defend the "true" .and "definitive"
meaning of the term "value. 1I I shall instead stipulate
the way in which I intend to use that term for the
purposes of this paper and assume that that definition.
so stated. merits the importance I have given it in
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relation to the problem at hand.
The "value,1I or "wor th," of something refers to the
result of a process whereby that object of interest is
ranked, by some valuing agent, of more or leB8 importance
towards making some decision.

That importance is calculated

in relation to the importance of some other object or objects
in terms of the situation in which the decision must be made.
For our purposes values are only relevant insofar as they
are capable of determining behavior, either actually or
theoretically.

A value is the

IJ

pre ference," when compared

with alternatives, by which any course of action must be
determined.

In other words, any decision to act is based on

a value or values by which that course of action is, itself,
"pre fered" or

~'valued II

above all others.

the reasons for deliberate action.

Values, then, are

For example, I may

decide to paint my house orange, that being my favorite
or "prefered tl color among the many possible choices for
house. paint.

My neighbors may, however, detest orange as

the color for a house.

Therefore, because I value my

relationship with my neighborhood more than what color
I paint my house, I may decide to choose my second favorite
color, blue, as preferable, all things considered.

The act

of actually painting the house blue follows from a decision
based on all of these relevant values.
What are the implications of stating that science is
free of values so defined?

To assert that science, as I
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have been speaking of it, does not admit of degrees of
worth or relative importance is to deny the freedom of
the scientist to pass judgement on the objects of his
scientific interest, namely empirical data and theories.
He may only determine the consistency of that data with
those theories according to preestablished rules of inductive
and deductive reasoning, which are themselves value-free.
The validity of a scientific theory is not in any way
affected by the behavioral decisions made by the scientist
based upon any aspect of that theory.! (unless, of course,
the theory is meant to predict or explain the behavior of
scientists UDder certain situations).

It is only the

validity of that theory which is important to science
itself.
It may be granted that certain generally recognized
rules of scientific procedure are accepted as

II

valuable II

though without in any way affecting the validity or internal
consistency of a scientific theory.

Such criteria as

fertility, simplicity, and elegance are considered important
for relating a theory to others and for assuring that the
theory itself will be comprehen$ible to other SCientists,3
while ignoring them cannot, of itself, invalidate a theory
(though doing so could make science a very difficult

*

*****

Caution!: This is not to assert that scientific theories
are not affected by the values of scientists (i:e. which
theories actually come into being), only that the validity
thereof is not affected when tested properly.
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endeavor).

These values affect the quantity though not

the Itquality" of science, the truth value.

The definition

6f science probably does not make it manditory to "know"
as much as possible.

Therefore, because such value

considerations are not, at least logically, necessary
aspects of scientific procedure they are probably better
designated the values of scientists rather than scientific
values.
As a matter of fact, values, as I have defined them,
can themselves be known and analyzed according to
scientific criteria.

Values of individuals or societies,

as demonstrated in behavior, can be classified according
to type and examined in terms of motivation or expression.
Such is indeed the function of the behavioral sciences or
the descriptive aspects of psychology, sociology, or
anthropology.
Science can. therefore, predict values but cannot,
as I said earlier. prescribe values.

Science cannot

dictate how we should act but only how we have acted or
might act (both in the sense of options and odds).

The

economist E.F. Schumacher in his critique of modern economics,
Small is Beautiful, reiterates this point:
Science cannot produce ideas by which we could
live. Even the greatest ideas of science are
nothing more than working hypotheses, useful
for special research but completely inapplicable
to the conduct of our lives or the,'interpretation
of the world. 4
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Errol E. Harris) in an essay entitled IlReason in Science
and

Conduct~"

also summarizes the problem encountered by

the scientist and logician attempting to devise a
solution to something of the nature of an environmental
crisis.

He indicates, in the process, the route by which

such a solution needs probably to be sought:
The reduction of reason to a purely formal
instrument and the belief that substantive
knowledge can be derived only from senSU0US
observation produces a complete revolution
in attitudes to morality and political
ideals. For pure intellectual analysis is
in~ifferent to good and bad, right or wrong,
and provides no motives for action. Even
Aristotle, who venerated reason, declared
that pure intellect moves nothing. Moreover,
qua purely analytic, it cannot be the source
of any constructive conception of human
nature.:;l
Science, understood in this manner, can describe what
nature or human values are, but the scientist, using only
those tools provided by proper scientific

procedure~

can

not determine what he might want nature or human values
to be as opposed, perhaps, to what they actually are.
He certainly can not decide what nature or human values
"ought tt to be in any kind of ethical sense.
the scientist

mere~y

"Ought" for

describes the high statistical

probability of the occurrence or existence of an event
or state.

"Ought" for the moral philosopher denotes

something very different.
Ilfvioral value" presents the same sort of problems
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in definition that were encountered with the more general
term "value."

Nevertheless. in a similiar approach to

Harold Osborne's assessment of the situation with respect
to It'values," C.H. W"nitely, in his article "On Defining
'Moral',11 explains:
While there are many principles, attitudes,
problems which everybody would agree in not
calling Il morallt, there are large numbers of
doubtful cases, and no generally accepted
criteria for drawing the line. Thus a
reasonably exact definition must depart from
usage to some extent. Such a definition
should not be judged as correct or incorrect; 6
it should be judged as suitable or unsuitable.
An·!_ "ethic" or

II

morality" postulates or prescribes for

some person or group "moral values."

lIl-loral value, n for

the purposes of this paper, shall stipulate that species
of value, as previously defined, which carries with it
an lIobligation ll on the part of the valuing agent to
behave as morally prescribed.

An

lI

o bligation" is a

command to action; the "obliged" is bound to a certain
form of behavior. theoretically without question (except
perhaps in the case of a conflict of obligations).

This

is true whether or not the valuing agent would otherwise
have similiarly behaved according to some criteria of
prudence or self-interest.

A "moral value" is what

Kant describes as:
.•• an imperative which commands a certain conduct
immediately, without having as its condition any
other purpose to be attain~d by it. This
imperati ve is catQgorical. '{
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As stated earlier, it is the most important or
values which guide conduct.
moral values
values.*

lI

prefe~d

The claim is, then, that

ought ll to be the most important or prefered

This is, of course, not always the case or moral

values would never have been isolated from general value
considerations as they have eeen.

There are certainly

countless cases of persons professing high moral standards
who, nevertheless, upon occasion, : behave llimmorally.1I
Behaving immorally consists in setting a self-interest
value above, or more important than, a moral value and
behaving accordingly.
Moral values, therefore, are rather difficult to
distinguish empirically from any other value considerations,
at least in other persons.

One possible distinction, apart

from verbal assurances, is evidence of guilt or remorse if
moral values are violated, that is) if self-interest values
are placed above moral values.

In terms of a moral

obligation we speak of being "bound to the conscience. 1I
As its sanction, therefore, we feel guilty.

Unless such

gUilt can be generated it is impossible to convince
someone that they have behaved immorally.
I am in general agreement with W.K. Frankena when he
says that:
•••• morality is and should be conceived as something
" pra.ctical" in Aristotle's sense, i.e. as an activity,
enterprise, institution, or system-all of these words

* This is not to deny that *****
some moral values are more
important than others (a serious problem in Kant).
shall become more obvious later on.

That
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are used and it is hard to know which is best
whose aim is not just to know, explain, or
understand, but to guide and influence action,
to regulate what people do or try to become or
at least what oneself does or tries to be. 8
I have been infering that moral values are something
'tlhi ch can only be imposed on the indi vidual by himself.
Nevertheless, it is common practice to prescribe morals for
others.

Indeed, we often encounter those who would have

us live under their own set of universal moral standards.
intending to prescribe behavior for human beings in general.
It does not, of course, follow that we need make anyone
else's moral standards our own, i.e. we need not feel guilty
if we break their moral code.

Nevertheless. as the phibsopher

Frederick Olafson points out:
Usually •.• ethic8 is assumed to have a special
interest in those values that have a bearing
on human action and propose a g.oal for human
effort; it is natural, therefore that questions
about the summum bonum-the good for man-Shoul§
be of primary importance for ethical thought.
To presuppose the existence of moral values which are "the
good for man" is to presuppose that all men ought to behave
in certain ways.

The upshot of this is that we feel morally

obligated to impose our moral values on others.

In terms of searching for those moral values which
would constitute "the good for man,1I I agree with John
Passmore's insistence that:
••• an ethic ••• is
simply decide to
not in the least
'new ethic' will
or not at all. 10

not the sort of thing one can
havej 'needing a new ethic' is
like 'needing a new coat'. A
arise out of eXisting attitudes.
~,

This is easy to see since the search"lI a new ethic" which
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would constitute lithe good for manu presupposes " existing
attitudes" which question the old ethic, or lack thereof,
upon which the new ethic would have to be founded.*

As

stated earlier, crisis involves a conflict of values.
The problem 1s to determine which values to retain and
which to abandon, since all cannot be maintained simultaneously.
I shall argue that basic moral considerations, values which
would probably be satisfactory to anyone with some moral
sense. ought to be made in order to determine the solution
to an environmental crisis.

Probably only in this way can

potentially disastrous, and immoral, consequences be avoided.
Clearly this is the role for the philosopher to play, be
he perhaps also a scientist, in an environmental crisis.

*

*****

This is not to assert that moral values cannot (for
the amoral) be instilled or at least enforced (for the
amoral and immoral). (See Chapter 6) I am merely saying
that those who would do this must first come to some
agreement. based on their existing attitudes, aa to
what those moral values ought to be.

Chapter 2
VALUES AND

~Il-iE

NEED FOR A NEW TECHNOLOGICAL I1PARADIGMIl

In response to the last chapter I might well ask:
But can an environmental crisis be solved without science?
As I think has already been demonstrated, science alone is
not sufficient to resolve a crisis.

Science, by itself,

lacks a call to action which is the foundation for human
behaVior.

However, this is not the question, the question

being, rather: Is perhaps science a necessary component for
the solution to an environment crisis?

Clearly, I think,

man as a social animal could achieve nothing without
science.

Science is, and always has been, an integral

part of man and his society.

Indeed, we could hardly

communicate with one another without some sort of mutually
understood, or scientific, groundwork for human language.
Certainly we could have no conception of environmental
crisis without the scientists.

Science must set the

scene in which values must determine the decisions.
In reality, science can never be divorced from human
values.

To this point I have defined science apart from
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values in an abstract sense.
can never really be done.
dependent.

In practice, however, this

All human endeavor is value-

As already stated, to give reasons for human

behavior is to refer to human values which direct that
behavior.

To decide to do something is to weigh value

options and to guide one's conduct accordingly.

Science

1s clearly a human endeavor involving the deliberate
behavior of those human beings who are scientists.*
That science is done means that it is done for reasons
of value therefore making science value-dependent.
Nevertheless, science is intended to solve problems
not in the sense of value conflicts but rather problems
in the sense of what the philosopher of science Thomas
Kuhn defines as "puzzles:"
Puzzles are, in the entirely standard meaning
here employed, that special category of
problems that can serve to test ingenuity or
skill in solution. Dictionary illustrations
are t1jigsaw puzzle" and "crossword puzzle" ..•
Iv is no criterion of goodness in a puzzle
that its outcome be intrinsically interesting
or important. On the contrary, the really
pressing problems, e.g., a cure for cancer or
the design of a lasting peace, are often not
puzzles at all, largely because they may not
have any solution. 1
In other words, the scientists decide what puzzles to
tackle on the basis of their values but the solutions
to the puzzles themselves are preestablished (though

*

*****

I use the term 91 sc ientist" here loosely, not refe:qing
necessarily to any specific group of professionals but
rather to anyone who engages in a process of interpreting
phenomena in mutually understandable terms.
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perhaps not yet discovered), admitting of no human decision
or choice as to what that eventual solution will be.

The

solutions to puzzles must be described, not prescribed.

It

is in this sense that we speak of science as value-free.
Where do puzzles come from?

What criteria determines

that a question may legitimately be termed a puzzle?

Thomas

Kuhn is noted for his recognition, in ~ience, of the role
of

n paradigms:1t

Ituniversally recognized scientific

achievements that for a time provide model problems and
solutions to a community of practitioners."2

Puzzles

are chosen in terms of paradigms and the criteria for
selecting scientific problems, or puzzles, in terms of
an operating paradigm can tend to preclude issues of
the magnitude of an environmental crisis from the scope
of, what Kuhn terms, "normal scientific

research~tr

He

explains this as follows:
We have already seen, however, that one of
the things a scientific community acquires
with a paradigm is a criteria for choosing
problems that, while the paradigm is taken
for granted, can be assumed to have solutions.
To a great extent these are the only problems
that the community will admit as scientific
or en_ourage its members to undertake. Other
problems, including many that had previously
been standard, are rejected as metaphysical,
as the concern of another discipline, or
sometimes as just too problematic to be worth
the time. A paradigm can, for that matter,
even insulate the community from those socially
important problems that are not reducible to
the puzzle form, because they cannot be stated
in terms of the conceptual and instrumental
tools the paradigm supplies. 3
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The conclusion from this, therefore, is that there exists
no paradigm which makes the solution to an environmental
crisis obvious and thus no readily available "conceptual
and instrumental tools" with which to tackle the issue.
In order to apply science to environmental crisis, then.
the environmental crisis must first be turned into a puzzle.
To turn environmental crisis into a puzzle requires the
discovery of a paradigm which makes it identifiable as
such.
It,would probably be useful here to introduce the
distinction between "theoretical'! and "applied II science.
As already stated, science, as a human endeavor, is value
dependent in terms of the reasons for which the scientific
research is pursued.

It is in terms of these reasons, or

goals, that these two types of science can be distinguished.
While the actual research scientist may work primarily to
make money or because he likes to solve puzzles it is
normally reasonable to ask why he is being paid or
supplied with puzzles.

Theoretical science has

as

its

goal the acquisition of knowledge in order to sataify human
curiosity and nothing more.
it's own sake."

We call

this~owledge

for

Applied science, on the other hand, has

as its goal the solution of human problems, that is, the
achievement of valued states of being.
research falls in this category.

Most scientific

Therefore, to the extent

that science solves problems which are not simply a lack
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of knowledge we may call it applied science, or the term
more commonly used, IItechnology.1I
As pointed out in·: the introduction, it is the prevailing
opinion of many persons that technology cannot solve an
environmental crisis and indeed may be a principle cause
thereof.

A blind faith in the ability of technology to

pull us through is denounced as lithe technological myth. II
There are dangers in the interpretation of this, however,
and certain implications ought to be made explicit.

For

example, E.F. Schumacher, I think, gives a prime example
of a paragraph which might easily misrepresent the nature
of environmental crisis:when he states that:
If that which has been shaped by technology,
and continues to be so shaped, looks sick, it
might be wise to have a look at technology
itself. If technology is felt to be becoming
more and more inhuman, we might do well to
consider whether it is possible to h~ve something
better-technology with a human face. 4
The dangers lie in the possible belief that technology, by
itself, is somehow the cause of an environmental crisis.
Only the last phrase, the possible existence of IItechnology
with a human face,1I saves this paragraph from making that
assumption.

John Black, too, in The Dominion of Man,

appears to make the same mistake when he states that:
liTo attempt to find an answer to the present ecological
crisis in terms of more and imrroved technical intervention
is illusory.1f
continues:

He qualifies himself, however, when he
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ITmay solve this crises, perhaps the next and
the few following ones, but it fails to recognize
that the situation arises directly from our
attitude to the world and what we are to do with
it.5
The possible misconception here is what I call lithe
myth of the technological myth. 1I

This concept, it seems to

me, makes the implicit assumption that the primary solution
to an environmental crisis involves a change in human
technology apart from human values.

In this case it is

not more technology that is required but less or none at
all.

In fundamentals it makes all the same mistakes as

the technological myth.

I think, possibly, that Aldo

Leopold best sums up my point here when he says:
By and large, our present problem is one of
attitudes and implements. We are remodeling the
Alhahmbra with a steam-shovel, and we are proud
of our yardage. We shall hardly relinguish the
shovel, which after all has many good points, but
we are in need of gentler and more objective
criteria for its successful use. 6
&.'

Why did we want to call blind faith in technology a myth
in the first place?
we want to change?

••

What is it about that situation that
The problem,

~8

Leopold tells us, is

not the technology itself but the uses towards which we
as human beings put technology.

It is the goals of

technology which are the problem and those goals are
eltablished by human values, not by some inanimate entity
"technology. II

I think Van Rensselaer Potter is certainly

correct on this point:
When we speak of dangerous knowledge, we have
to admit at once that knowledge in itself cannot
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be inherently good or bad. What has lent credence
to the concept of dangerous knowledge is that
knowledge is power, and once knowledge is available,
it will be used for power whenever possible.
Knowledge once gained can never be left to gather
dust in a library or locked successfully in a
vault. No one worries about knowledge that is
not used.
It 1s the uses to which knowledge is
put that make it dangerous or helpful.?
Much of modern technology could be considered "dangerous
knowledge," and should certainly be interpreted in this
sense.as explained by Potter.
\~

Power " has developed ugly connontations in our society.

We naturally assume, at least politically, that he who has
power will abuse it.

Hence, we are wary of too much

technological control in the hands of the politicians,
or those responsible for the management of our society,
because that control can be used to harm us.

Certainly

we can't count on the scientists themselves to watch out
for the public interest for as Lewis Mumford warns:
Give the scientist his laboratory, give him his
budget, give him his assistants, give him his
honors, and he'll work for any government or
corporation without challenging thg objectives
or questioning the social results.
What ought to be our reaction to this?

Should we attempt

to pull science free from political or corporate control?
Clearly, Lynton Caldwell points out, in terms of politics,
this is impossible:
Hostility to the idea of the social control of
science is commonly based on the assumption that
science can exist independently of a political
milieu and that science, free from "political
interference," can advance indefinitely even
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though politics does not undergo a commensurate
improvement. The assumption that politics cannot
be improved is widespread and not easily refuted.
But if politics is incorrigible, it must surely be
because people are generally incapable of learning
from experience or of paying the social costs of
scientific advancement, one cost of which is clearly
a more effective management of the natural assets
of society. The notion that modern science could
exist totally independent of ~itics has no
foundation in actual practice. 9
The fact is simply

that~chnology,

because it is a human

endeavor seeking the solutions to human problems, cannot
proceed without some kind of guiding impetus.

Technology

cannot control itself; only human beings can.control it.
How does. man determine what uses to make of

technology~

Rubin Gotesky, in an article "What Criteria for Scientific
Choice?", explains that:
••• scientists do not at any given time seek the
Truth; they seek and can only seek certain truths;
and they seek them because, in given circumstances
and under given conditions, the finding of certain
truths, if possible, are considered more important
than others1 0
But is not to consider one thing more important than another,
by the definition we attached to the term, to determine
relative values?

Technology plays·a part in environmental

crisis because the values which guide technology are
apparently in conflict with other human values.
this is the nature of crisis.

Clearly

However, this need not

be so, and eliminating that conflict does not necessarily
mean eliminating technology.

Indeed. how could technology

be eliminated without recognizing the role values play in
its implementation?

If the dangerous consequences of
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technology are caused when human values dictate the
acquisition of certain technological goals, how will we
ever eliminate those dangerous consequences without first
altering those human values which are the primary cause?
And if we could alter those values whose consequences
make technology appear so dangerous perhaps we would
discover

that~chnology,

as a human tool guided by more

favorable values, is not so threatening after all.

In

summary, then: If human values which guide technology
can be made better in the totality of their consequences,
we probably wouldntt need to eliminate technology.

If

those human values cantt be changed, or made better, we
wouldntt be able to eliminate technology anyway_
The technological myth is, however, a very real problem
if interpreted correctly.

As Garrett Hardin delineates:

A technical solution may be defined as one that
reqUires a change only in the techniques of the
natural sciences, demanding little or nothing
in the way of change in human values or ideas
of morality _11
To point out a "technological myth" is not to assert that
technical solutions to environmental problems are not
possible.

What 1s asserted is

that~chnical

solutions

based upon our present system of values and morality
are not possible.

Hardin gives an example:

It is fair to say that most people who anguish
over the population problem are trying to find
a way to avoid the evils of overpopulation
without relingu1~hlng any of the priveleges
they now enjoy.
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The root of our present environmental crisis 1s not
technology by itself but the human values which guide
technology.

Only if those can be altered will a technical

solution to an environmental crisis become possible.
Lewis Perelman summarizes the problem involved with
both the "technological myth" and the "myth of the technological
myth" when he asserts that the environmental crisis: "is
fundamentally a crisis of ideas rather than a crisis of
things. 1I13
If the environmental crisis is a crisis of ideas, or
more particularly values, science can have no real role
to play in its solution until the human values which
determine what that solution oUght to be are settled.
Thomas Colwell, in an article on the implications of
ecological revolution, mentions that:
Since the consequences of our technological means
have produced the ecological crisis, it follows
that the ends we have followed are suspect by
implication. The search for a new theory of manls
relationship to Nature therefore centers around
the search for a new conception of the
and
values which guide the means we employ.

r2dS

Along the same line William Blackstone asserts:
If this is true, if these values and attitudes are
mistaken and are the root of the problems, then we
need what Friedrich NeitzBche called-a transvaluation:
of values. We do not need the kind of transvaluation
that NietzBche wanted, but we do need that for which
ecologists are calling, that ia, basic changes in
man's attitude toward nature and man's place in
nature, toward population growth, toward the use of
technology, and toward the production and distribution
of goods and services. We need to develop what I
call the ecological attitude. 15
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This search for new values or goals by which to derive
a scientific solution to an environmental crisis is what
I shall refer to as the establishment of a new "technological
paradigm."
In order to turn an environmental crisis into altpuzzle tr
it will first be necessary to establish a Ildominant parad1gmU
for mankind which makes it apparent as such.

Willis Harman

defines Kuhn's term in such a way that, though perhaps not
changing the original meaning, makes it more clearly applicable
to the problem at hand.

He refers to the "dominant paradigm"

as: "the basic way of perceiving,thinking, and doing,
associated with a particular vision of reality.,,16

We

have already seen that if such a "vision of reality" is
to redefine an environmental crisis in scientific terms,
as a puzzle for the technologists, it will have to
incorporate certain human values.

We tend to shun such

a concept because we know from experience how difficult
II

it is to come to agreement on what constitutes correct
human values.

II

Nevertheless, unless we can come to some

kind of basic agreement the environmental crisis will
stand insoluable, in fact for

man~

unseen.

Indeed I think that such a paradigm can be established.
I think that there are basic moral values which are
generally accepted and which, if generally respected,
would clarify both the nature of and solution for an
environmental crisis.

The new technological paradigm
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must incorporate these basic moral values allowing us
to establish goals for action which are consistent always
with the dominant paradigm.

Our paradigm must incorporate

what Potter calls "wisdom:"
Science is knowledge, but it is not wisdom.
Wisdom is the knowledge of how to use science
and how to balance it with other knowledge.
Albert Schweitzer said: "our age has discovered
how to divorce knowledge from thought, with the
result that we have, indeed, a science which is
17
free, but hardly any science left which reflects. 1I
Indeed, this is where the philosophers must take a bold
step forward and carry the bannerJfor what group is better
equipped to handle the question of moral values?

Colwell

agrees:
In any event, the centrality of the ecological
revolution stands as a clear call to philosophy
to exercise its traditional role of critic and
interpreter of scientific and cultural revolution.
Perhaps one of the reasons for the irrelevancy of
much contemporary philosophy is its failure to
perform this role at the level of ecological
change. 18
Our ultimate goal, when faced with environmental crisis,
is to ensure that the future~~etter and not worse, since
these are the only alternatives offered.

At least a better

future must consist in the removal of that which threatens
presently to make it disastrous.

Hopefully a better future

would consist in even more than simply a negation of present
evils.

If the future is to be better it must be better in

relation to values which we already hold, otherwise we would
have no reference point from which to value it now.

If this

were not true the future would merely be different, not
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better.

Such a future would be impossible to implement for

it presents no obvious goals for which to aim technology,
or human endeavor in general.

This should not be surprising J

for the meaning of crisis, as we have already discovered, is
that there exists a conflict of values: some of them must
be frustrated if others are to reach their goal.

Therefore

I think that Harmon may somewhat overstate his case when
he maintains:
I want clearly to distinguish what we are
hypothesizing from other changes which are
revolutionary in a social or political sense
but do not involve transformation of the basic,
19
implicit, unchallenged, taken-asgiven metaphysic.
As I stated in the first chapter, supported by a quotation
from John Passmore, I believe that unless our new paradigm
does not arise out of existing attitudes and values, in
particular moral values, it will not arise at all.

Unless

the seeds for recognizing the new paradigm are not already
within at least a few of us, there is no hope for its
discovery and implementation.

It is only on the basie

of this "implicit, unchallenged, taken-as-g1ven" moral
metaphysic that we can possibly conceive of a better
future in the face of an environmental crisis.

Many of

our present important human values, those to which Harmon
is really refering, upon which we presently postulate a
better future, will have to be swept aside for they will
conflict with our moral paradigm.
Indeed, it is only on the basis of this new paradigm
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that an environmental crisis can properly be viewed as a
crisis, that is that it becomes apparent that the future
must be either better or worse in terms of this most basic
moral metaphysic.

We must examine the coherence of all of

our other values in terms of this moral paradigm.

If we

find them to be compatible there is no need to fear a crisis.
If some of the

~

important values which we presently hold

do turn out to threaten those basic values which we hold
to be most precious, we are in trouble.

I fear a proper

analysis of the facts in relation to such a paradigm might
very well conclude that we are indeed entering a period of
environmental crisis, as might be evident from the Introduction.
I can only hope that I am wrong, or if not, that mankind
possesses enough wisdom to make the proper corrective measures
with technology contributing to eradication rather than the
promulgation of such a crisis.
Van Renssalaer Potter tells us:
Mankind is urgently in need of new wisdom that
will prOVide the "knowledge of how to use knowledge"
for mants survival and for improvement in the
quality of life. This concept of wisdom as a
guide for action-the knowledge of how to use
knowledge for the aocial good-might be called
Science of Survival, surely the prerequisite to
improvement in the quality of life. 20
Walter O'Briant, in "Man. Nature, and the History of Philosophy,lI
states:
We need a Weltanschauung-a view of the wholeto guide us in establishing our priorities for
action. Science and technology can give us the
means, but religion and philosophy must delineate
the ends. 21
And Harmon asserts:
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Science in the claimant paradigm will be clearly
understood to be a moral inquiry. That is to say.
it will deal with what is empirically found to be
good for us, in much the same sense that the sciBnce
of nutrition deals with what foods are wholesome
for us. 22
All three of these men are saying basically the same thing.
We need a new technological paradigm which consists in a
new set of ends or goals. based on human values. towards
which the technologists ought to strive.

It shall probably

be our ability to do this which shall determine whether an
environmental crisis. if such should
or not.

exist~,

goes unsolved

As Robert Heilbroner states:
For the gravity of the human prospect does not
hinge alone, or even principally, on an estimate
of the dangers of the knowable external challenges
of the future.
To a far greater extent it is
shaped by our appraisal of our capacity to meet
those challenges.~3

In what such a new technological paradigm must consist
shall be the topic of the remainder of this paper.

For

if this cannot be established, my "appraisal of our
capacity to meet those challenges" shall be very grim
indeed.

Chapter 3
THE OBLIGATION TO FUTURE GENERATIONS

We in the United States are already beginning, I
think, to feel the pinch of environmental crisis.

Clearly

the symptoms which I described in the introduction have
become increasingly apparent in the last 25 or 30 years,
particularly pollution and resource scarcity.

Other lands

are much worse off, adding serious overpopulation to the
list of environmental plagues.

In the face of this, most

Americans ean still voice satisfaction with the present
course of history.

Yet in the event of environmental

crisis the present course of history cannot continue
indefinitely.

If indeed environmental crisis is upon

us, and if we continue to ignore that fact,
consequences must inevitably follow.

disa8t~eus

The suffering has

already begun for most of those in Africa, Latin America,
and much of Asia.

The western world has been able to

maintain itself so far, often at the expense of these
less developed nations.
will the axe fall?

The question is, however: When
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The answers, in terms of timescales, vary.

Nevertheless,

even for the most emphatic of "the doomsdayers ll it is
generally agreed that we still have a little time by
which to live under the old values.

Those now alive will

probably not be the ones most seriously affected by
environmental crisis, though some of us may yet live
to see our present value system collapse (or change).
Most of the undesireable consequences

of~our

present

actions, it is agreed, will be meted out most harshly
on those generations yet unborn.

This is not to preclude

the fact that the widespread proliferation of nuclear arms,
my fourth environmental problem (see Introduction), threatens
to

surp~ise

us with environmental catastrophe at anytime.

This is not to preclude the fact that famine is a daily
threat to a large proportion of the world's population
even now.

These facts only add to the threat of ultimate

disaster for our future generations.

The problem is, then,

to decide how we ought to behave when the consequences of
our present behavior may be the circumstances under which
those who now have nothing to say about it must live.
Van Rensselaer Potter says:
The survival of world civilization will be
impossible unless there is some agreement on
a common value system, especially on the concept
of an obligation to future generations of man. i
We have already discussed the first clause of this statement
in the last chapter and have found it likely to be true,
labeling this "common value system lt our new technological
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paradigm.

I think that the second clause of Potter's

statement is an obvious addendum; indeed it must be the
foundation for such a

paradi~.

Unless there can be

. established an obligation to future generations I believe
that there is small hope of even identifying an environmental
crisis)except as it can most immediately affect us (i.e.
nuclear war, famine, etc.)

In other words, since a crisis

involves the valuation of future states of affairs, in this
case a state of affairs in which we will probably not be
liVing, the denial of any obligation to persons who are
in fact living under those future circumstances means
that the concept of environmental crisis would probably
have little meaning for us, except, as mentioned, when it
can be linked to more proximate hazards.

What, indeed,

is the status of such an obligation?
As already stated, our new paradigm must arise out
of existing attitudes or it has no hope of realization.
In order to establish an obligation to future generations
as a foundation for a new technological paradigm it will
first be necessary, then, to determine the extent to which
such an obligation is considered reasonable as a human
value.

In other words, are we capable of thinking in terms

of such an obligation?
It would appear that we might not be capable of
holding such a value.

As John Black explains:
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As a general rule, most of us are prepared so
to manage our affairs that we and our
contemporaries do not suffer; self-interest
sees to that. It is the transfer of this
interest in the general good of mankind to the
future-particularly the remote future-that
raises difficulties. 2
In a systems analysis relating personal interests and
timespan, the Meadows research team

conclud~

in The Limits

to Growth:
A person's time and space perspectives depend on
his culture, his past experience, and the immediacy
of the problems confronting him on each level. Most
people must have successfully solved the problems
in a smaller area before they move their concerns
to a larger one. In general the larger the space
and the longer the time associated with a problem,
the smaller the number of peQple who are actually
concerned with its solution.)
Robert Heilbroner, recognizing the
of affairs

que~es

reali~y

of this state

in a bit more emphatic tone:

When men can generally acquiesce in, even relish,
the destruction of their living contemporaries,
when they can regard with indifference or irritation
the fate of those who live in slums, rot in prison,
or starve in lands that have meaning only insofar
as they are vacation resorts, why should they be
expected to take the painful actions needed to
prevent the destruction of future generations
whose faces they will never live to see? Worse
yet, will they not curse these future generations
whose claims to life can be honored only by
sacrificing present enjoyments; and will they not,
if it comes to a choice, condemn them to nonexistence
by choosing the present over the future?4
Clearly, based on the

~anner

in which we normally go

about placing values on thingsjwe find it very difficult
toevalu~very far into the future.

It 1s difficult to

value something, as in the case of future generations,
to which so much uncertainty is attached.

It is difficult
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to hypothesize too far into the future for the farther
we go the less sure we can be that what we are thinking of
will ever be realized; or similiarly, we see only a haze
with nothing clearly distinguishable to put

our finger on.

In terms of future generations, then, as Black states:
It is when we look even further into the future
that we find ourselves thinking not in terms of
known and identifiable individuals, in whom we
have a personal stake, but in an abstract,
unidentifiable posterity.5
Likewise. Joel Feinberg says:
The real difficulty is not that we doubt whether
our descendants will ever be actual, but rather
that we don't know who they will be.
It is not
their temporal remoteness that troubles us so
much as their indeterminacy-their present
facelessness and namelessness. b
By the same token, it would naturally appear that the less
we know of some person or persons the less concern we can
muster for that person or persons.

Taken together, these

facts make it difficult for us to actually concern ourselves
with future generations.

As Aldo Leopold asserts:

The erasure of a human subspecies is largely
painless-to us-if we know little enough about
it. A dead Chinaman 1s of little import to us
whose awareness of things Chinese is bounded by
an occasional dish of chow meln. We grieve only
for what we know.?
Indeed modern economic practices would seem to make
concern for future generations obsolete.

For one thing,

it is much easier to operate without having to make future
considerations.

As Schumacher explains:

To be relieved of all responsiQlity except to
oneself, means of course an enormous simplification
of business. We can recognise that it is
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practical and need not be surprised that it is
highly popular among businessmen. 8
Future man can give

UB

nothing now and therefore cmnot be

dealt with on normal economic terms.

Concern for future

generations is more than just a burden, it commits the
sin of being IllUleconomical.1I

William Ophuls states

that:
••• any purely economic man must ignore the
interests of posterity. for-rr-has no agent he
can bargain with in a market place and nothing
of economic value to offer him. It is an
economic fact that posterity never has and neYer
will be able to do anything for UB. Posterity
is therefore damned if decisions are made
lI e conomically.u9
Indeed, not only does it seem very difficult for man to
concern himself with future generations; by Borne of our
modern standards or

values~it

is positively wrong to do

so.
Nevertheless, interestingly enough, none of those
quoted so far in this chapter would deny that we did
indeed have an obligation to future generations.

Surely

there are those who do deny that obligation, indeed on
rational economic grounds.

Hel1broner quotes a

Distinguished Professor of political economy at the
University of London as writip,g:
Suppose that, as a result of using up all the
world's resources, human life did come to an end.
So what? What is so desirable about an indefinite
continuation of the human species, religious
convictions apart? It may well be that nearly
everybody who is already here on earth would be
reluctant to die, and that everybody has an
instinctive fear of death. But one must not
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confuse this with the notion that, in any
meaningful sense, generations who are yet
unborn can be said to be better off if they
are born than if they are not. 10
I don't think. however, that the quoted position is the
prevailing one, in our society at least.

The value system

upon which modern economics thrives is not all-inclusive
of human concern.

According to one of our value systems.

then. it may not make sense to value posterity. but I
am in basic agreement with John Black when he says:

Nevertheless, it seems quite clear to me that we
do concern ourselves for the future of the world.
As far as I can ascertain western man always has
done. It may seem irrational. for we are calling
upon ourselves to make sacrifices not so much on
our own account. that we may benefit from them
ourselves. ~vt for the benefit of generations as
yet unborn.
Heilbroner voices the same opinion, viewing the above quoted
Distinguished Professor's words with skepticism:
For it is one thing to appraise matters of life
and death by the principles of rational se1f
interest and quite another to ~ re~bonSibilitY
!2! ~ choice. I cannot imagine the Istinguished
Professor from the University of London personally
·consigning humanity to oblivion with the same
equanimity with which be writes off its demise. 12
The point being made by both of these men is, I think,
not that we evidence a high value for posterity in all of
our actions or words, but rather that, whether we necessarily
realize it or not, when knowingly faced with the question
of the interests of future generationsowe find we do indeed
have an obligation to protect at least some of those interests.
The feeling of an obligation to future generations usually
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only arises, however, as Heilbroner illustrates, when we
must IItake responsibility for our choice. 1I

In other

words, it is in the act of consciously deciding for those
yet unborn that our obligation becomes apparent.
We must be careful here, however.
'I

I do not mean to
j.

infer that, by itself, our responsibility for the future
necessitates any sort of obligation.
It

Certainly we are

.,

responsible for the future but we are not, because of
thetfact alone, thereby obliged to behave in any particular

manner.

"To be '~esponsible fortl something merely represents

a causal relationship between the agent and the consequences
of his action.

To be

II

responsible for" something is to

be the reason for its occurrence or existence, be that
thing an event or a substance.

It would appear that if

we are presently involved in an environmental crisis, the
collapse of the future civilization of man would certainly
be our responsibility, in the sense that the reason for
that collapse could easily be traced back to us (and, of
course, to those before us).

In this way, changing our

present actions would change what we would ultimately be
"responsible for."

The Distinguished Professor could,

therefore, freely admit that we are responsible for the
future condition of man but could still deny that we,
thereby, have any obligation to alter our behavior.
The problem, in this case, is that being "responsible
for" something does not involve a value judgement, while
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an obligation does. "Responsibility for" is a scientific
fact; causal sequences are purely descriptive.
facts are only

II

Scientific

r ight" or "wrong ll in terms of truth value.

No manner of behavior is prescribed.

We will surely be

accountable to future generations in the sense that they
can ask (or at least wonder) why we behaved in a manner
which was the cause of their present state or situation.

But they can not on the basis of our IIresponsibility for"
their situation praise or blame us for that situation, in
the sense that they would desire to reward or punish us
if they can or could, unless it can be shown that we should
have behaved in a way other than we did.

There must have

been a reaBon why we " ought ll to have valued another course
of behavior over the one we actually chose, or valued.
In order to establish an obligation, in taking
"responsibility for" our choice we must feel a "responsibility
to" those for whom we choose.

"Responsibility toll future

generations grants them the right to blame or praise us
for our present actions.

Only if this sense of

responsl~ity

can be established does there exist an obligation, and
therefore a moral duty, to behave in a certain manner.
Can we

go~out

establishing the validity of this moral

responsibility which is, I am arguing, necessary for the
institution of a new technological paradigm?

In other

words, perhaps this obligation can be traced back to
obligations even more basic than itself.
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John Rawls, though unconcerned with the problem of
environmental crisis in his book A Theory

Qf Justice, does

comment on the problem of determining posterity's interests.
He believes that this problem, like all other social issues,
ought to· be dealt with according to the concept of I1justice. 1I
Rawls believes that future persons do indeed have legitimate
demands to make on us and that justice dictates that:
Each generation must not only preserve the gains
of culture and civilization, and maintain intact
those just institutions that have been established,
but it must also put aside in each period of tim~
a suitable amount of real capital accumulation. 15
It is up to us to determine what is just for future generations
and what amount of real

capi~al

accumulation should and

can be affordetl to pass on.
John Passmore argues that concern for posterity (and
not just the posterity of persons) is a necessary aspect of
man's capacity for love.

Passmore agrees that personal

utility provides no grounds for true future concern.
Nevertheless, as I already mentioned, he notes that persons
do indeed surrender personal satisfactions for future interests,
receiving only in retur» the fullfillment of

l~ve

spent:

When men act for the sake of a future they will
not live to see, it is for the most part out of
love for persons, places and forms of activity,
a cherishing or them, nothing more grandiose. It
is indeed self~contradictory to say: 'I love him
or her or that place or that institution or that
activity, but I don't care what happens to it
after my death.' To love is, amongst oth~~ things,
to care about the future of what we love.
~

There is also what I call the argument for immortality.

u
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Anyone who believes that our lives are important after
death will probably feel an
who will still be here.

obliga~n

I am not

to care for those

mer~refering

to glory

in heaven or burning in hell as just rewards of an omnipotent
god, though this could surely have an effect if the words
of that god favored posterity.

Immortality for many is

the consequences of their lives here and now that live
on after they die.

For some this may be but the erection

of a large, sturdy, gravestone bearing the deceased's name.
Many of usJthoughJdesire to leave a favorable image for
posterity to reflect on.

This, we realize, will probably

be based on the nature of , the deeds we perform.

Passmore

calls this tendency to think in terms of immortality a
manifestation:.of

II

self-love: n

Sometimes, one must grant to the Augustinian moraliBt~
what is involved in a concern for posterity is a form
of self-love, the desire to win 'immortality.'. An
institution, a person, is then thought of as carrying
forward into the future at least one's name and perhaps
some dim memory of one's character and achievements.
So a grandfather may wish to have a grandchild named
after him, or a municipal councillor a street or park.
An author may be content to have his name inscribed
on a catalogue card in theBritish Museum; an
Ozymandias may have his statue set up for admiration
of all who pass by. In a way this is pitiable, as
Shelley saw. but perhaps it is essential to the
continuance of civilization. 1 5
Most of us would" likely accept that to be responsible for
the collapse of civilization in the future would not be
an impressive hallmark to leave behind.
Probably the most convincing argument for most people
is the argument for an obligation to our children and its
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extrapolation.
a child.

Most people have children and everyone was

We are certainly responsible

agree responsible

t~our

children.

fo~

and most would

Parents seem naturally

to desire to give their children the best they can, and this
often means making their childts life better than their own.
Since we often get to see our grandchildren, concern for their
welfare follows as naturally.

As Garrett Hardin says:

"~n

some psychological sense posterity and ancestors fuse together
in the service of an abstraction called lIfamily.tt16

To get

from concern for one's visible family to concern for one's
unseen family of the future follows, it seems to me, from
our concern for our children respecting their concern
for their children respecting their children's concern
for their children,

:ad In.fini tum.

Getting from this to

concern for all families or general posterity can also,
I

think, be done.

Our children, and family in general,

must livefn the world we create and since our children are
shaped not only

~

ourselves but Qytheir environment, this

logically means we are responsible to their environment
also.

Chances are that the better the child's environment

is, the better will be the life of the child.

Different

personts may have conflicting views about what an ideal
future for their children's and children's childre~~Jetc.
would look liKe, but what stands in common may provide a
general guide for action.in terms of posterity as a
whole.
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Whatever the reasons for holding it, I believe that
most of us do accept, at least to some degree, a moral
obligation to future generations.

It is my belief that

this must set the foundation for a new technological
paradigm, not only directing the solution to an environmental
crisis but, in addition, determining where the real problem
lies.

A crisis involves a conflict of values, that is, one

value or set of values held contradicts another set of
values held by the same agent or agents.

Resolving a

crisis, then, involves determining which value or set
of values is more important and should be retained,while
abandoning conflicting values.

If concern for future

generations is indeed a moral value it is by definition
more important than mere values of self-interest or prudence.
That we often don't hold to that obligation 1s merely
evidence that moral values can be difficult to abide by,
not necessarily evidence that such a value doesn't exist.
To be the foundation for our new paradigm is to have the
authority to direct technology.

In this case, technology

must never be used to endanger the interests of future
generations and, indeed, if necessary it ..··must ensure
that those values will be preserved.

Any values which

oppose these goals must not, therefore, carry any authority
to direct human technology.
Exactly how to go about determining what the interests
of posterity are and how to preserve those interests will
be the object of the remainder of this paper.

All we can
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say for certain now is that we recognize that there are
some demands which we feel posterity has the right to make
on us.

At this point in time most people perhaps do not

realize the threatening potential consequences of their
present actions to future generatfons.

Therefore that

obligation is never challengedj we are never called upon
to take responsibility for our actions, to have
responsibility to posterity.

This makes the solution

to an environmental crisis somewhat circular in the
sense that we must realize our obligation in order to
pe~celve

the danger, but we may not realize our obligation

until the danger becomes dangerously apparent, until
perhaps it is too late.

We can only hope that there are

enough persons sufficiently aware of the situation and
their obligation to point out to the rest of the world
the error of their ways, the crisis situation.
Indeed, though not apparent to many perhaps, the
sinister consequences of our present behavior may not
be far off.

As Passmore states:

We now stand, if the more pessimistic scientists
are right, in a special relationship to the futurej
unless we act, posterity will be helpless to do so.
This imposes duti~s on us which would not otherwise
fall to our lot. 1"{
If this is

tru~

posterity may not have even the option,

to any appreciable <'legree. of being "responsible for ll
their own environment.

We may indeed be viewed as being

among the last generations with the luxury of really
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deciding what life could have been like for our posterity.
If indeed we have the capacity to be aware of that situation,
to not decide the future for posterity will be to decide
it.

Chapter 4

THE SURVIVAL OF HUMAN VALUE:
THE VliUE OF HUMAN SURVIVAL

A value, as an empirical entity, represents no more
than the result of a process whereby some object is
evaluated by some valuing agent.

Nothing can "possess"

a value until it is aslgned one.

Because of this an

object only acquires a value once it has been evaluated
and then only for the agent doing the evaluation.

The

point I wish to make by this is that, empirically, a value
establishes a relationship, here and now, between two entities
and without both entities and a given time a value does not
exist, or at least has no real meaning.

In this sense

then a value means simply that there is, at some time
or for some duration of time t, some object X and some
agent Y such that Y values X.
Value theorist Zdzislaw Najder agrees with this basic
interpretation of value as long as it refers to particular
values as actually experienced:
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Empirically, all valuable objects are valuable
for somebody, primarily for given social groups,
and whatever of value we encounter in actual
practice, is valuable when considered to be such
by somebody. In other words: we know no valuable
objects apart from objects valued, i.e., considered
valuable ••• 1
He amends this understanding of "value ," however, when he
refers to potential, non-existent values:
••• However, from the theoretical (logical) point
of view things are valuable with respect to and
because of definite value-principles. For example:
Andrew has rescued a child from a house on fire.
His act is empirically valuable, because there are
some people who know of it and value it; it is
valuable theoretically, because there exists a
value-principle which says that it is good to
save human life. This distinction enables us to
solve the problem of value of unknown objects:
they may be theoretically valuable without being
valuable empirically, i.e., without being valued
by anybody.2
Clearly our search for a solution to an environmental crisis,
via a new technological paradigm, must establish value
principles, based upon an obligation to certain interests
of future generations, which explicitly state how human
beings ought to behave in certain situations.

It is

important to remember however, I want to argue, that we
must be able to conceive of the theoretical future interests
of posterity, as stated in certain value-principles under
which we are (ought to be) obligated to live today, as
applying to Borne future valuing agent.

In other words,

while it may be possible, by means of such value-principles,
to conceive of theoretically valuable objects not yet
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empirically valuable (the interests of posterity as yet
unperceived by posterity) it must at the same time be
possible to conceive of theoretical valuing agents for
whom the object is theoretically

valuable~(posterity

itself) as a reasonable expectation.

Without this

understanding "theoretical value l1 lacks any meaning,
simply by definition of the term "value."

As Harold

Osborne points out: "Propositions of the form IX has
value' are strictly indeterminant until a definite class
of valuers for whom X has value is understood. n3
It is assumed, of course, that Najder is refering to
the value systems of human beings when he speaks of
value-principles.

In particular, in the case of his

example, he specifies that subclass of human beings holding
the general belief that "it is good to save human lives."
It is. ,however, entirely possible for other creatures
besides man to make value judgements and therefore hold
values, though these may not appear to the creature as
conscious value-principles.

Clearly we can speak of

the values held by other animals as species and as individuals.
In the situation presented by an environmental crisis it
becomes of vital importance to know whose relative interests
or values are paramount.

I argue that we must approach

a solution to environmental crisis on the basis of human
values, human interests being the only interests with
which we are intimately familiar and therefore the only
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foundation for a reasonable paradigm for technology.

I

understand human interests, however, in the same way as
does John Passmore:
One of my colleagues, an ardent preservationist,
condemns me as a 'human chauvinist'. ~aat he
means is that in my ethical arguments, I treat
human interests as paramount.
I do not aptQlogise
for that fact; an 'ethic dealing with manta relation
to land and to plants and animals growing on it'
would not only be about the behavior of human beings,
as is sufficiently obvious, but would have to be
justified by reference to human interests. 4
In other words, the interests or values of

aw

other entity

must first be perceived through the eyes of a human being,
if indeed we are to be aware of them, and are therefore
subject to human values in terms of their interpretation.
Value-principles can be simply self-serving principles,
in other words principles for action which have as their
goal the satisfaction of self-interest values.

Quotations

from someone like Ben Franklin come to mind in this regard.
Early to bed and early to rise, makes
a man healthy, wealthy, and wise.
Don't throw stones at your nei~hbors',
if your own windows are glass.
Moral principles, on the other hand, are not necessarily
self-serving.

Moral principles present guidelines which

obligate behavior regardless of the effect on the agent.
In terms of an environmental crisis, as already explained,
we will have to deal in terms of moral values, because the
sacrifices demanded of us by the interests of posterity
may be great.

Moral principles as a subset of value
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principles in general are subject to the same relational
character as value-principles.

Therefore, in order for

something to be morally valued there must exist a moral
agent to morally evaluate it.

Likewise, in order for

there to exist theoretical moral values based upon
moral principles there must be a realistic expectation
of the existence of theoretical moral agents at the time
the evaluative process is to occur.

Otherwise the term

"theoretical moral value" has no meaning.
It is argued that certain of the "higher" or more
intellegent mammal forms other than man appear to exhibit
behavior which could be characterized as founded on moral
evaluation.

Certainly, one of the most prorninant arguments

for protecting the dolphin is that its behavior seems to
evidence a "higher mental capacity" to rival that of man,
perhaps including a moral sense.
~

Nevertheless, I think

position as quoted in Passmore above still stands.

The environmental crisis is understood first and foremost
as a crisis of human values.

The environmental crisis has

been caused, and must be solved,by man.

This does not mean

that a human ethic cannot obligate the preservation of the
dolphin, only that it must be recognized that the primary
moral agent involved in the solution must be human.
Because the environmental crisis is a crisis for
man, the solution to an environmental crisis must, by
definition, intend to bring about a better future for man.
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The goal in establishing such a solution then is to make
certain that all value-principles involved in our new

paradig£~t~wards that better future, or at least
present no threat to it.

The central point I want to make

in this chapter, to which I have already alluded, is that
for there to be conceived a theoretically better world of
the future, as an end towards wbich present morally obligated
actions are but a means, we must be able to assume the
theoretical future existence of valuing agents, indeed
valuing human agents, for whom the world will actually
be better.

Since behavior according to moral principles

would seem to imply the striving towards a morally better
world it would further be true that a morally better world
must assume the existence of moral agents, for our purposes
moral human agents.
"Survival," simply stated, means: lito remain existing,"
or: lito continue to exist. 1I

Future eriented moral principles,

as guidelines towards a morally better future world, would
naturally seem required to provide for the survival of the
moral agent for whom the future is to be morally better.
If indeed those moral agents are human beings, as the
entity with whom we purport to be concerned, we must
assume to be planning jor a world in which at least some
human beings will survive.

If this is not the case the

future will not actually, in human terms, be morally better.
To put it simply, if human beings as at least a species

-68

containing some agents holding our moral values can not
be guaranteed survival, can not be assured of continued
existence t the search for a solution to an environmental
crisis probably becomes a meaningless endeavor for us.
As obviously indicated. that the human species might
survive does not necessarily presume that there will at
the same time continue to exist moral agents among its
ranks holding moral values similiar to ours.

It is

certainly possible to conceive of a world full of human
beings none of whom holds any of our moral values.

Such

a world would possess no morality in our sense, and would
therefore have no conception of what it might have been
like to have been morally better in our terms.

Such a

world ought not to be the object of a solution to an
environmental crisis.

This speaks directly, I think, to

a concern narrated by Passmore:
Let us suppose that we have good ground for fearing
that men can continue to survive as a species only
within a wholly tyrannical society, dimly fore
shadowed by Hitler's Germany or Stalin's Russia,
in which the rulers, aided by modern observation
devices, will succeed in utterly destroying personal
affection or any form of human enterprise. In such
a society art survives only as a form of flattery,
science as monitorial technology, philosophy as
ideology. Suppose. furthermore. that we also have
good ground for believing that a society of this
sort will cover the entire surface of the earth and
that there is no possibility of tts ever changing.
From such a world, everything some of us love would
have disappeared, not for millennia, but for ever.
In terms of Rawl's account. this would be a posterity
which would not hand on what we had handed on to it.
We should be-unique in being the last generation to
be free. 5
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For Passmore, such a society would clearly be void of any
moral value for us as viewing it in the present.

Why ought

anyone realizing this, he asks, make sacrifices in order to
ensure that it comes into existence?: "Should we not then
content ourselves with doing the best we can in the present,
leaving posterity to stew in its own jUiCe?,,6

Clearly I

think we must, but, and this is very important, only on
the condition that we are absolutely sure that the society
of the future must be, morally, totally undesireable.
Otherwise we are obligated to seeing that mankind in the
future has the opportunity of creating something better
than we have now.
Nevertheless, it is still true that any moral principles
meant to provide a solution to an environmental crisis,
unless such a solution is absolutely impossible, contradict
their own goals if they do not take into account the
continued existence or survival of mankind.

It is a

self-defeatingLsystem which ordains men to create a better
world for men which will have no men in it.
obvious that we simply assume it.

This is

80

Nevertheless, I think

that the assumption of continued human survival is no longer
necessarily valid and that that fact ought to be clearly
recognized.
We presently live in an age when Robert Heilbroner
can open a popular book like The Human Prospect with the
following:
There is a question in the air, more sensed than
seen, like the invisible approach of a distant
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storm, a question that I would hesitate to ask
aloud did I not believe it existed unvoiced in
the minds of many: "Is there hope for man?"7
For Heilbroner, not only do mankind's present behavioral
trends spell almost certain civilizational collapse of
some sort in the not too distant future, they carry within
them the potential seeds for "an impending catastrophe of
fearful dimensions. II8

William Watts, president of the

Potomac Associates, a group which helped sponsor the
widely acclaimed The Limits to Growth, acknowledges this
threat of catastrophe in his foreward to that book; hoping
that the book:
••• will lead thoughtful men and women in all fields
of endeavor to consider the need for concerted
action now if we are to preserve the habitabilgt y
of this planet for ourselves and our children.
Barry Commoner, author of The Closing Circle, another
widely read work, states:
The issue of survival can be put into the form of
a fairly rigorous question: are present ecological
stresses so strong that-if not relieved-they will
sufficiently degrad~ the ecosystem to make the earth
uninhabitable by man? If the answer is yea, then
human survi~al is indeed at stake in the environmental
crisis. Obviously no serious discussion of the
environmental crisis can g16 very far without
confronting this question.
Commoner makes it clear J in the course of his work, that
he does indeed perceive a very real threat to human survival.
With all of the warning we have thus far received, even
should that threat turn out to be illusorY,it is certainly
an issue we should look into openly and honestly with all
haste.

Inaeed we are morally obligated to do so.
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It is no longer the case that we can ignore the threat
of oblivion.

In establishing a moral system with any

provisions for the interests of posterity we must recognize
the priority of the survival imperative.

We must realize

that for any future oriented moral principles to
make sense they must in no way threaten human extinction,
for such a value would contradict its very goal.
cannot be better for man without man.

The future

In regards to

Passmore's problem, or what many think of as lithe 1984
problem~

I can only think of one solution.

We must ask

ourselves whether it appears without a doubt that the
continued existence of mankind can only be maintained at
a terrible price.

Indeed we must ask ourselves if we had

to live under such a system if we, in all honesty and with
a full realization of the human capacity to adapt
satisfactorily to new situations, would choose extinction
for ourselves and our loved ones rather than living under
the system.

What I am getting at is that human survival

will almost certainly require great sacrifice and a loss of
freedoms, whether voluntary or forced.

This, alone, however,

is not grounds for dooming posterity to extinction.

Indeed

this could result in what those living under such a system
might regard as very satisfying conditions considering the
circumstances.

The question is not an easy one and must

be weighed with great care.

If there is any hope of

pnoYiding a satisfactory future for posterity, however,
I think that we are morally obligated to seeing that
they survive to enjoy it.
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This then is the first point to add to any new moral
paradigm for applied science, all things considered.

It is

indeed a fundamental interest of posterity that it be allowed
to be at all.

It ought to be the goal of technology, therefore,

to ensure, first and foremost, that the
species is not jeapordized.

sur~ival

of the human

Thus survival value ought to

override (almost) any value, moral or not, which contradicts
it.

In terms of the

~

problem I can only say that

the end does not justify any means.

Indeed we ought to

utilize the "least offensive" technological means which,
nonetheless, still insure human survival.
states in an article enti tIed:

n-.,.rn.a t

John Platt

We Must Do:"

In the past, we have had science for intellectual
pleasure, and science for the control of nature.
We have had science for war. But today, the
whole human experiment may hang on the question
of how fast we now press the development of
science for survival. 1 1
This is true for all of the sciences and their applications,
both natural and social, for without corresponding change in
all spheres of human life the goal of human survival will
probably not be achieved.

Presently, without the acknowledgement

of the priority of human survival as a long term goal which
our new paradigm would bring, we are guided by a variety of
values, moral and non-moral which may carry us unknowingly
to a premature end, an '. end which we never desired but yet
may never have anticipated.

An analogy is obvious, I think, in the field of medicine
where those alive now represent the doctor and posterity the
patient.

Just as the doctor would prescribe no treatment
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which unnecessarily threatned the survival of the patient,
so we too ought to realize, and indeed feel the obligation,
that we should initiate no program which threatens the
survival of posterity.

The difference is that while the

doctor operates (no pun intended) under a paradigm which
expressly states that the doctor ought

n~unnecessarily

threaten the survival of the patiant J for otherwise any
threatment would be valueless, we aren't at present forced
to think in terms of any such expressly stated paradigm in
relation to the species.

If we wereJperhaps we would see

the foolishness of our ways.
There is no reaeon to believe that a better future will
come immediately, even if we can guarantee human survival.
Though Potter agrees with my basic paradigm, he emphasizes
th±s point:
It seems that a reasonable way to build a value
system would be to set up as a minimal requirement
the survival of the human species under conditions
that would permit further evolution and delay
extinction. For if we admit with Teilhard that we
do not now live in an ideal society and that we
cannot change it overnight, we must agree that we
have to have time to decide what kind of a socie
we want and what steps we must take to secure it.

r2

In addition there is certainly no reason to believe that
safeguards which guarantee the survival of man will be
easy for present generations to accept.

Heilbroner warns

of the threats such a new paradigmatic outlook imposes on
society and each of us as individuals:
Let me therefore forewarn the reader that he must
be prepared to face problems in which values and
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beliefs precious to him may be assaulted by
overriding claims of human survival, and that he
must therefore be prepared seriously to consider
painful conclusions if he is not sim~ly to
substitute preference for analysis. 1 3
The so-called 1984 problem must be viewed, I think, in the
light of both of these facts.

Nevertheless, if there is

even a flicker of light at the end of the tunnel I think
that the effort to preserve mankind is worth making.

I

don't understand how a being which prides itself on its
unique rational character could allow itself to be
exterminated by its own devices.

Nevertheless, as

Stephen Pepper warns in an article entitled:"Survival
Value:"
Through social intelligence men may keep the
impact of the sanctions for survival at a distance
and so allow satisfactions a wide range of freedom
to expand. But if this social intelligence lags
and fails, the penalties of biological maladaption
to the life zone man himself has largely brought
into being will inexorably take their toll. 14
The threat of human oblivion should indeed now be a serious
issue for all rational

peopl~

"Is there hope for mankind?"

and they are serious who ask:

Chapter 5
ENVIRONMENTAL PLANNING:
THE LONG-lUNGE SURVIVAL OF HUMAN VALUE

A paradigm which merely established safeguards for
the survival ot the human species would not, by anyl'cmeans,
annul the fears ot most of those concerned with the potential
consequences at an environmental crisis.

For one thing,

the survival ot a species, as a goal, need only guarantee
the continued e%1stence ot a very limited number.

The

sale presence of one man and one woman on earth, with the
opportunity and ability to mate, could conceivably represent
survival of the human species.

It seems to me that most

people would simply not be satisfied merely to know that
at least one man and one woman would surv!ve an envirnnmental
catastrophe.

In fact, even a system which guaranteed the

continued eristence ot a small number of people snch as
might survive a nuclear holocaust would not be laaeled by
many a solution to an environmental crisis; it would not
ensure the potential for a future which by any conceivable
standards could be better than the present state ot crisis.
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In addition we may raise the specter
mentioned in the last chapter.
of survival worth?
reach a point

Perh~s

in~time

o~

12§! which I

What price is the insurance

it may happen that we shall

when it becomes apparent that human

survival can be maintained under only the most horrendouB

ot conditions: conditions which we living today could not
conceive of as satistying any of the human values which
make humanity worth preserving.

I am not saying that it

human civilization ever arrived at that point people would
not still grasp at whatever means ot selt-preservation were
available.

In other words, I am not at all certain that

we will not inevitably arrive at such a point (1984 or tar
worse) whether we would acknowledge that today as a
desireable future ornnot.

Nevertheless, my only point

here is that a new paradigm should not have as its goal
or end merely survival by whatever means.

As Passmore

states, paraphrasing the words ot the philoBopher M.P.
Golding:
••• we should, Golding says, be reluctant to act
on the predictions ot what he calls 'crisis
ecologists l , who would have us plan for mere
survival. We should do better, in his words,
Ito confine ourselvestto removing the obstacles
that stand in the way ot posterity's realising
the social ideal l • 1
This is true, however, only it we keep in mind that striving
tor "the social ideal h is only a reasonable goal

i~

we can

guarantee the survival of mankind.
Indeed, that human survival is in jeapordy even should
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the worst of our
in

Though

itsel~.

~ood

~ears

be realized is a much disputed point

~amine,

caused by overpopulation and

shortage, or disease, caused by famine or worldwide

pollution of Bome sort, could theoretically decimate the pop
ulatioD)it is unlikely that every last man, woman, and child
would be exterminated (though there are arguments to the
contrary).

Probably nuclear devastation on the massive

Beale with which any nuclear war would likely be involved
carries the

thr~at

of to*&l annihilation of the human

species, and most other forms of life on earth as well.
Nevertheless, there are those who dispute even this point
(usually the military) and argue that there would indeed
be survivors to a nuclear holocaust even if those survivors
have to live in underground sealed chambers for an indefinite
period

o~

time.

The point is that even Bomeone who believed

in the survival value of bomb shelters in the event of
nuclear war, the most serious threat to human sunvival as
a species in all likelihood, would probably not be satisfied
that even in the event of such a nuclear war an environmental
catastrophe would have been avoided.

For as !he Limits to

Growth states:
The crux of the matter is not only whether the
human species will survive, but even more whether
it can sURVive wltho~t falling into a state of
worthless existence.
Though ufever, famine, and war," as perhaps representing
the inevitable conclusions of present uncorrected civil1zational
trends, may not actually threaten species survival, they are
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not eventualities towards which we could conceivably look
forward with anticipation.

Indeed, it is the promis.

o~

such consequences should some sort of corrective measures
not be made that would constitute the very existence of
Yhat we would term an llenvironmental crisis."

In other

times the collapse of a civilization would designate the
end of a particular culture in a particular place at that
particular time, that culture being absorbed into or simply
replaced by another.

Because of modern day intercommunication

and interdependence. economically and CUlturally. of peoples
it is possible. in many repects, to speak of worldwide
civilization as one entity.

Certainly modern technology,

when used anyWhere in the world. is used in the same manner,
that is, to obtain the same goals.

In this way civilizational

collapse could ultimately entail the collapse of all
civilization on earth.
In the event that we are indeed faced with environmental
crisis it is inevitable, simply by the n.ture of crisis, that
certain major changes would be required to avoid any kind of
civilization collapse.

In other words, important human

values would have to be sacrificed.

Clearly, and probably

most importantly. the .. standard o! living J II as we presently
understand ,that term, would have to be lowered at least !or
the average American.

In terms o! resources alone The Limits

to Growth points out:
In order to guarantee the availability of adequate
resources in the future. policies must be adopted
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that will decrease resource use in the present •••
as long as the friving feedback loops of population
and industrial g~owtb continue to generate more
people and a higher resource demand per capita. the
system is being pushed toward its limit-the
depletion of the earth's non-renewable resources. 3
What would happen to the world if

most~of

the non-renewable

resources upon which modern civilization depends were to run
out suddenly is probably something unpleasant to think about.
Surely any sort of obligation to future generations would
morally rule out such behavior.

Nevertheless. if this. in

itself (the lowering of the "standard of living"). 1s cons..idered
the primary symptom of a civilizational collapse then there
really can not exist an environmental crisis as I have defined
that term.

A IIcrisis" retains the option for a future that is

better than the present threatened state of affairs.
then. if there

~B

ClearlYt

to be a satisfactory resolution of an

environmental crisis it is not going to be on the basis of
an encreased material standard of living.
Therefore. I am basically in agreement with Barry Commoner
when he says:
This does not necessarily mean that to survive the
environmenliI crisis. the people of industrialized
nations will need to give up their "affluent" way
of li:te. For as shown earlier, this "affluence,ll
as judged by conventlenal measuzes-such as GNP,
power consumption, and production of metalsTis
itself an illusion. To a considerable extent it
reflects ecologically faulty, socially wasteful
types of production rather than the actual welfare
of individual human beings. 4
A crisis is a conflict of values.

Such a conflict cannot

produce a healthy situation because sooner or later one value
will have us behaving in a manner obviously in contradiction
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. ~hanother.

For instance, it seems quite apparent that our

present desire for a constantly increasing standard of living
may very well conflict with

ou~moral

obligation to future

generations (and indeed perhaps with our personal desire
for future security and happiness).

The only way to

eliminate such a situation is to choose which conflicting
value is most important, discarding the
insofar as it creates

co~lict.

I

othe~

at least

have already argued that

probably at least the survival of future generations should
take precedence over any other values.

In addition, in

this chapter I have suggested that certain major environmental
calamaties which could potentially manifest themselves
worldwide, "fever, famine, and war," ought to be averted,
not only worldwide but locally if possible, and not only
for posterity but perhaps even for ourselves.

These are

moral values, meaning by definition that they are more
important than any value of self-interest or prudence.
I

would contend that a paradigm which consisted of all of

those values we hold most dear that were consistent with one
another, including above all, I think, those values we
hold to be moral obligations to posterity, would prmmise
a future which. at least for those living in it, would be
considered better than the present contradictory state of
affairs.

If nothing else, I think what Lynton Caldwell

says is true:
Failure to develop a workable environmental
ethic adds to the probability of a future in
which mass fru8~ration becomes the(dominant
Bocial problem.
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In stronger terms still, posterity would know that it would
not have to face sudden massive mortality or severe scarcity
of resourees in

1~8ier

its children's lifetimes.

Human

civilization would have escaped the chaos which a formerly
uncorrected state

o~

affatrs would have promised for it.

As Blueprint for Survival warns:
Faced with inevitable change, we have to make
decisions soberly in the light of the best
information, and not as if we were caricatures
of the archetypal mad scientist. 6
Garrett Hardin explains that our present

app~oach

to problem

Bolving is highly questionable and in the long run usually
ultimat.~~

ineffective:

The Newtonian response to almost any social ev~l
is to buy hardware in the hope that the problem
will somehow be solved by tke mere magnitude of
the expenditure. It seldom is. The Darwiniaa
response is to think before acting-i.e., to study
and to analyze, on the assumption that we are dealing
with a complex web of causes and effects, and that
intuitive responses will probably do more harm than
good.?
Both quotes, I think, point out the same error in modern
human reasoning.

Most of our personal values concern

immediate interests and therefore seem to require immediate
solutions.

Sometimes technology can prOVide ansatisfactory

immediate solution but more often the apparent solution
to one problem becomes the cause of another.

This is

surely the crux of the environmental crisis; what seems
good today is a threat to future interests.

If those

future interests turn out to be more important than the
present interests for which the harmful solution was
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devised we will certainly be

sor~

for our present behaYior

in the long run.
The only way to avoid a situation in which future
interests are inadvertaatly compromised is first of all
to be always aware of what those future interests are.
As I have already stated, a new paradigm must consist of our
moat important values. all of which being mutually compatible.
Secondly, we must proceed in a thoughtful manner taking
those future interests into account whenever necessary.
In other words, modern man must begin to plan his behavior
)

is such a way that the attainment of future oriented values
become goals towards which present behavior is, if necessary,
a means.

A new moral paradigm wouldrr,aake planning of this

Bort absolutely requisite to any kind of ethical behavior.
Clearly. if we are going to make an obligation to

certain

future interests of primary concern this is the only
responsible way to proceed.
The problem is. of course, that modern man. perhaps
mankind historically, has never realistically looked very
far into the future.

Long term considerations have always

been discounted for short term gains.

In addition, a myopic

world view, focusing on a very few variables over time, has
always been substituted for a broader view which takes into
account factors which might otherwise be unforseen but
influential in terms of obtaining the final goal.

This

is certainly not surprising)for planning reqUires an
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accurate prediction of what is or is not possible or probable.
In other words, because of unrorseen circumstances the
farther into the future we have to plan, and consequently
the more variables we must, or OUght to. take into account,
the less certain we can be that our plans will be realized.
We tend. therefore, to grasp for immediate and easily
obtainable short-term gains. perhaps at the expenee of
more important long-term goals.
tend to think in this manner.

Certainly modern economists
Passmore states:

Economists. quite unlike b~ologiBts, inevitably
think in short terms. This is one reason why,
in debates about the need for conserving raw
materials, they so often sound optimistic. From
their point of view it is quite absurd to worry
about what may happen thirty years hence. An
economist, indeed, thinks of himself as soothing
our conservationist qualms if he tells us that
supplies of a particular mi.neral will last until
the year 2000-1ess than thirty years off!8
Similiarly, William Ophuls tells us that:
••• for all practical p~oses costs and benefits
more than 20 years in the future are discounted to
zero; owing in part to additional factors like the
prevailing rate of return on capital, it is a rare
economic decision maker whose time horizon extends
more than ten years into the future. Thus. critical
ecological resources essential for future well-being
even 30 years from now not only have no value to a
rational economic decision maker, they scarcely enter
hie ealculations. He is therefore likely to make
decisions that irreversibly deplete or destroy vital
resources (especially since he realistically fears
that his own self-restraint would simply hand over to
another the opPoDtunity for profit). Thus, as Karl
Marx put it over a century ago, the watchword of market
capitilism is IlApres nous Ie deluge,1I as entrepreneurs
strive to maXimize current benefits at the expense of
the future. 9
Nevertheless, as Van Renssa1aer Potter asks:
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Ie it possible that civilizations become extinct
because they proceed on the basis of short-range
decisions and are unable to estimate their futura
needs in relation to their future environments. 1
The problem with ignoring long-term goale, or, as we often
do, making long-term predictions on the basis of an
extrapolation of present day circumstances and trends,
is that in a finite world circumstances can change quickly
and trends end abruptly.

If limits are unforseen, and

consequently unplanned for, they can and will eventually,
when reached, wreak havoc on mankind.

In other words, what

is true now, in terms of available resources, the earth's
tolerance for pollutants, political relationships, etc.,
may not (and will not) always be true and can not be counted
on in making future plans.

Unless we can anticipate some

of these changes we can not expect to alter our behavior
in order to adapt to our environment in a responsible manner,
taking into account future or&ented values.
reasonable if its attainment is possible.

A goal is only
A long-term goal

based on an assessment of the short-term situation does
not allow an accurate prediction of the possibility of its
actualization.

In other words, we are looking at the future

with blinders on.
The only way to avoid this situation is to always make
certain that short-term goals cohere with those long-range
goals which we consider to be vital.

Therefore, short-range

goals shoUld always be planned as if they were a means for
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or at least not in opposition to those long-range goals.

If

a conflict becomes evident the short-range goal must be
sacrificed or altered.

As opposed to extrapolating long

range goals from the short-term circumstances. planning short
range goals according to the long-term circumstances always
allows a realistic asses.sment of what the ehort-term. as well
as the

lo~-term.

circumstances will actually be.

This is

not E!ways necessarily true. as we saw, when the procedure
is reversed.

Planning for the long-term with a wide range

of variables avoids the surprise of discovering the
incompatibility ot our short and long-range values.

Only

in this way can value conflicts be avoided or resolved and,
for our purposes. an environmental crisis Bo1ved.
Unfortunately, most social planning,

includin~

plans

made in regard to the environment, have been to date what
Ophuls calls llincremental decisillons: n
Incremental decision making largely ignores longterm goals; it focuses on the problem immediately
at hand and tries to find the solution that 1s most
congruent with the status quo. It is thus ·charac
terized by comparison and evaluation of marginal
changes (increments) in current policies. not radical
departures from them; consideration of only a restricted
number of policy alternatives (and of only a few of the
important consequences for any given alternative); the
adjustment of end.s to means and to what i.s "feaslble ll
and "realistic"; serial or piecemeal treatMent of
problems; and a remedial orientation in which po,licies
are design~d to cu~e obvious.immediate 1l1s ral~er
than to br1.ng about some des.l.red future state.
Ophuls believes that such a procedure,iin relation to the
environment::at least. is better termed nmuddling through."
As Ophuls concludes:
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In sum, as a description, disjointed incrementalism
provides an almost sufficient explanation of ho~we
have proceeded step by step into the midst of ecological
crisis and of why we are not meeting its challenges at
present; as a normative~ilosophy of government, it is
a program for ecological catastrophe; as an entrenched
reality with which the environmenl~ reformer must cope,
it is a cause for deep pessimism.
Interestingly enough;:, in the same way in which Ophuls
analyzes environmental crisis in terms of modern man's
political organizations, Van Rensselaer Potter makes a
parallel analysis, without using the term "incrementalism,"
in the field of biology, in particular in the field of
eVOlution:
does natural selection so often lead to extinction
rather than to perfection? The reason is that natural
selection stresses short-time gains on a generation
to-generation basis. It cannot anticipate changes in
the- environment, yet the environment is constantly
changing. The survival of a species is determined by
how well it is adapted to its environment, and progress
1s in part definable as change that permits survival in
a changing environment. Following Thoday, we may propose
a new definition of the survival of the fittest by
saying that "the fit are those who fit their existing
environment and whose descendants will fit future
environments. h1 3
Why

Both men are saying basically the saa. thing in different ways.
Without the ability to realistically prOVide for future
circumstances it is possible to walk blindly into unforseen
situations which may result in catastrophe.for the species,
in this case man.

Indeed, historically, this has been true

not only for species but for human civilizations as well.
Without planning for the future, and not just the immediate
future, a civilization can only hope that its values do not
ultimately conflict, for this is what crises are made of.
It would appear that we, as modern civilization world-wide.
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and as responsible for the human species now and in the
future, have indeed unknowingly crossed our values.

We

have not realistically planned for an environment that is
sustainable or that will sustain us.

The consequences,

should radical change not be forthcoming, can not only be
b

Auessed at, but even rather acurately predicted.
I must therefore agree with Potter when he states:
We hold that the scientific-philosophic concept
of progress',::which places its emphasis on long
range wisdom is the only kind of progress that
can lead to survival. It 1s a concept that 1
places the destiny of mankind in the hands of
men and charges them'<-wi th the responsi bili ty of
examining the feedback mechanisms and short
sighted processes of natural selection at
biological and cul~ura1 levels, and of deciding
how to circumvent the natural processes that have
led to the fall of every past civilization. 14
Hovever I want to say more than this and, following up what
I brought out at the beginning of this chapter, affirm the

role of planning as a means of satisfying more than merely
survival value.

To the extent that our obligation,-to future

generations (and indeed the desire for our own future happiness)
is greater than mere survival, to that extent we are obligated
to plan for those obligations so that the future interests
of posterity will not be compromised.

Indeed it is only in

this way that we can avoid the survival of a human! ty we

might not have even wanted to see survive.
US

Man for most of

is far more than simply a biological organism maintained

by food, water, and air.

If that watthe case mere physical

survival would then be the goal of environmental planning.
"Environmental planning" has as its goal the maintainance
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of whatever environment is necessary to fulfill man's values.
Thesprerequisites to any environmental planning, then, is the
determination of what values axe to be the goals of an
environmental plan.
This

does~not,

however, mean that we axe free to choose

whatever values we please as a goal for human endeavor.
All human accomplishment is limited to the adaptabIlity of
the human environment.

In other words, if our demand upon

the environment 1e greater than the environment can supply,
our values or goals are unrealistic, and therefore unreasonable.
In order to establish reasonable goals we must begin, as
Willis Harmon asserts, by realizing that:
The new paradigm would remind us thai the root
meaning of economics is home management, and that
the planet earth is man' B home. Managing the earth,
with its finite supplies of space and resources and
its delicate ecological balance, and conserving and
developing it as a suitable habitat for evolVing man,
is a far different task than that for which the
present economic system was set up.15
Economics must be grounded in another science, whose title
comes from the same Greek root oikos, meaning "home."
~:Ecology"

means, in Greek,

II

the study of the home. It

In

English)it is the study of the relationship between living
things and their environment.

Without a proper understanding

of our "home ll we will never live comfortably within it.
Indeed Lancelot Law Whyte exclaims:
This is scarcely a hypothesis\ It is good biological
sense. A species capable of understanding must possess
balanced understanding in order to survive. Otherwise
in the excitement of exploiting PtGtial and unbalanced
knowledge 1t.~ill destroy itself.

-89

Whether or not human survival is actually at stake, it is
certainly true that the better we understand our environment
and our relationship to it the better chance we have of
living without contradiction in our values.
Thepurpose in learning more about man and his environment
is to provide ourselves with a realistic understanding of
the choice of futures open to us.

Russell F. RPyae, in an

article entitled t1A Method tor Planning Alternative Futures lt
explains:
As ecology accepts man and his works within its
field of discourse, it will have to talk less about
relatively determinant transitions toward some
stable equilibrium and refer more often to alternative
sequences of patterns-scenarios. The same scenarios
that would be useful to the new ecology of man as
planning referents also promise to serve abbroader
need by helping all of us appreciate the options
17
that are realistically open to man-in-the-biosphere.
As stated earlier, a goal is only reasonable if its attainment
is possible.

It would appear that an openness on the part

of modern man towards environmental planning might possibly
make him realize that his civilization is not ultimately
sustainable.

The future we project for modern civilization,

without containing any serious behavioral changes on the part
of-',mankind, is apparently not a realistic option.

If we

attempt to project all of our modern values on the future
I think we discover that the attainment of some goals
ecclipee8 the realization of others, and perhaps others
ultimately much more important.

Yet without this foresight.

and the resultant planning of human behavior, we might well
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stumble blindly into environmental catastrophe.

If man does

possess the ability to foresee environmental crisis, to not
act upon that knowledge is to violate our obligation to the
future

o~

mankind.

Ignorance 'Ic_ses responsibility only

if that ignorance is unavoidable.
ought to

~e

I don't think that this

the case for modern man.

And the longer we

wait, the greater the cost of reform to ourselves and to
the future, as

W~ter

Rosenbaum explains in his analysis of

The Politics of Environmental Concern, which is the title of
his book:
Generally, the longer the nation waite to create
prudent environmental management. the fewer options
will be available. themmore authority government
will have to poesess. the higher will be the economic
costs, and the more eevere the solutions: Delay, in
brief. leads to a situation increasingly close to
crisis and requires the social costs of crisis
management. 18
At this point, the "social costs of crisis management" are
probably already high, but delay can only make the solution
to an environmental crisis more difficult to obtain, if not
impossible.

An example of foreseeable crisis, and the need for
environmental planning, relates to what Garrett Bardin calls
the earth's ecarrying capacity.n19Carrying capacity is the
ability of an environment to support a population of a certain
size.

The problem is: How do we decide when an area is

"overpopulated'Z"
the

po~t

Paul Ehrlich de.fines overpopulation as

reached "when human numbers are pressing against

human values.,,20

If we possess a value system which

encourages reproduction we have clearly reached the crisis
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point

when'~verpopu1atiodJoccurs.

One set

o~

values has to

go; either we agree to "want" less children or we give up
IIluxuries" in order to support a growing population.

,Indeed

one of those"luxuries" which we lose may be watching mo.st
of our children survive infancy.
~uality

Yet if we are aware of the

of life"we wish to maintain we ought to be equally

aware of the environment necessary to support it.

We must

therefore adjust our population accordingly, finding the
optimal carrying capacity.

Only by planning the future with

all of our values in full view can this be possible.
One of the principle arguments against long-range
planning is that we don't, in effect, really possess the
ability to foresee consequences to the extent necessary to
make responsible decisions about a course of action.

Science

can never provide a perfect and complete picture of lIreality"
and unforeseen variables can make planning difficult if
not futile.

Nevertheless, I agree with William Blackstone:

Information from any empirical science must have
some degree of tentativeness about it. The degree
may be higher in ecology. But such caution 1s
important, for as Aristotle pointed out so well,
ethics and politics deal with variables and although
we cannot have absolute certainty in these areas of
normative decision, we must base those decisions on
the best data and theories. In the case of the p~oper
use and management of our environment, tremendous
consequences in terms of the quality of life are
at stake. 21
The consequences of environmental catastrophe, if real, are
so threatening that the risk of partial knowledge as a basis
for action is far less than the risk of ignoring completely
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the situation.
Nevertheless, we must not ignore this warning completely.
The question is: To what extent ought we to plan for the
future?

Our understanding of our environment is never

complete and, therefore, unforeseen circUMstances can play
a major role in altering what seems to be a reasonable
expectation.

As Passmore states:

Society, as much as nature, resists men's plans;
it is not wax at the hands of the scientist, the
planner, the legislator. To forget that fact, as
a result of conservationist enthusiasm, is to
provoke rather than to forestall disaster. 22
Willis Harmon warns:
Every major policy decision tends either to foster
change or to impede it. Actions which attempt to
force it too fast can be socially disruptive; actions
which attempt to hold it back can ~ake the transition
more difficult and perhaps bloody. 3
Both men point out what I call lithe threat of overplanning."
Roughly speaking, it is probably true that the farther into
the future that we attempt to plan, the more variables enter
into the calculation and the less chance we have of predicting
possible futures.

The danger is probably greatest because,

as John Black points out:
From our wwn vantage point in history, we project
our own ideals and our standards into the future,
belieVing that those elements of our environment
which we hold most precious will also appear so to
our descendents. 2 4
In summary; we cannot be certain

t~what

we save for posterity

will necessarily be something that posterity will want or can
uae.

As Passmore says: IIWe cannot be ,9,uite sure that a beggar
will not choke on the bread we offer him. 1I25
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Because of the restrictlonsoon the extent to which
possible future states can be predicted, and thus planned
for, we must be careful, I think, about the extent to which
~

attempt to do this.

The only general rule of procedure

that I can come up with for determining the timespan a
plan ought to have is that the more important the value,
the farther into the future we ought to plan for its
satsifaction.

Nevertheless, each successive generation

ought to have the abill ty to reaffirm or al tar any plan,
depending on the changes in human value which occur over
time.

planning would then be on a generation to
generation basis. 26 There may, however, perhaps be
Lo~range

obligations which we can conceive of as applying to all
of mankind over all time, or far all practical purposes to
infinity.

In other words, these would be values. indeed

I think they would have to be moral values, which can
never be allowed to be contradicted.
inflexible the
better.

planJthe~

The more rigid and

in relation to such a value the

I have already identified thesurvival of the human

species as one such value

~though

even here, as pointed out

earlier, there may be qUalifications) for I agree with
Jeremy Swift when he says:
We cannot know what will happen a hundred or a
thousand years hence, and an we can do is set
goals for the human environment in a spaceship
economy that we believe worthy, and revise them
periodically. But one principle above all others
seems to be self-evident: what we do now should not
limit the choices open to our descendants. We do
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not even know for certain that pos~erity will care
about the environment,>but we must at least give
them the choice. 2 7
There may be others, but they should be chosen with extreme
care.

Nevertheless, I

a~ree

with Kirtley F. Mather when

he concludes his article entitled "The Emergence of Values
in

Geologic[~ife

Development" with the words: "The description

and selection of the most noble human values arelliterally of
cosmic significance today."28

I also have confidence in

man's ability to make this selection, if he should ever set
his mind to it.

Certainly any creature which calls itself

lithe rational animal" has no excuse not toxealize its highest
goals.

SUrely mankind has been around long enough to have

learned quite a bit from the past; at least Robert Matthews
seems to think so when he states, in itA Future .for the Past: lI
History is the record of human action, individuals
and societies planning and acting, Through his
historical study, the long-range planner has the
unique privelege of viewing these earlier planners'
choices and decisions, from above as it were, seeing
both the antecedents and the consequences of their
planning decisions. Recognizing planning to be a
very fundamental and very old aspect of human
eXistence, the long-range planner hopefully will
develop the tempered confidence in man's ability to
plan for his future, a co~idence which will be
necessary in order that he do well his own task of
planning. I.f this historical appreciation can be
achieved, the study of history will certainly have
contributed its share towards assuring the quality
of life in the future.2~
Why 1s modern civilization shirking its duty to plan
for its obligations to those generations yet unborn, and
~deed

for the future well-being of those now alive?

Why

can not modern man at least think in terms of a paradigm
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which allows technology to work towards ensuring that at
least those future generations will exist?

Robert Matthews,

I think, explains the problem well:
Wi th the Jong-range planner ••• our nontechnical
demands are great, and his nontechnical
responsibilities are heavy: he must choose between
the possible future;world-stateS:--That this choice
is fundamentally nontechnological in nature, that
technological consideratins serve only as constrants
upon acceptable possible world-states, cannot be
overemphasized. We Americans suffer from a naivete.
or perhaps more correctly an intellectual timidity,
which attempts either to translate the nonquantitative
dimension of human existence into quantitative tBrms,
or simply to neglect this dimension altogether. 3
As I stated earlier. we must face up to the fact that an
environmental crisis puts human values at stake.

We cannot

employ a technical solution. we cannot apply science to the
problem. until we have defined what the problem is and where
we hope to be once the problem is "resolved."
requires planning.

Clearly this

It is the failure to establish a

paradigm providing guiding values and the obligation to

plan for the future which makes us think that we have lost
control of our society. that we are the nprisoners" of
technology.

Langdon Winner has written an entire book on

this problem which he entitles: Autonomoas Technology.
In it he states:
Technology, then. allows us to ignore our own works.
It is license to forget. In its sphere the truths
of all important processes are encased. shut away,
and removed from our concern. This more than anything
else, I am convinced, is the true source o~ the
colossal passivity in mants dealings with technical
means. 31
Can we break out of this syndrome and get a firm grasp on
science

80

as to apply it to purposes which we hold to be
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moat vital?

Can we really develop a paradigm which

encorporates an ethic powerful enough to put science back
\l

IJ

under clear control?

I can only hope that this is possible

for I believe *lth Lynton Caldwell that:
An ethic powerful enough to control the use of

science can be hardly les8 than an ethical system
s~ficiently strong and compraenaive to shape
the goals and procedures of society.3 2

Chapter 6
INSTITUTING A NEW MORAL PARADIGM

I have proceeded to this point in the paper with the
belief that the elements of the new technological paradigm
which I have so far proposed can be accepted by most thinking
people and viewed as a guideline for the institution of
necessary changes into modern society and civilization.
I have assumed the existence of an obligation to future
generations consisting in at least a guarantee of their
right to an existence, and I have affirmed the legitimacy,
and indeed ,the obligation. of engaging in long-range
planning as the only responsible manner of aealing with
the future.

I believe, in other words, that these are

basic moral'obligations and that all human behavior ought
therefore to be consistent with them.

Otherwise, I think.

we cannot help but feel guilt at their betrayal.

On the

basis of this new moral paradigm, by which technology is to
be given a ,new direction and guidance, I hope to see history
change its present course.
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Apparently not all behavior, however, is consistant with
such a paradigm or we probably would not be speaking presently
in terms of an "environmental crisis. 1I

Ideally persons who

encouraged or engaged in behavior which dondemned the interests
of future generations, at least those interests which we have
delineated to be most vital, would be, in modern society,
deserving of the same treatment we presently give to those
who encourage or engage in criminal activity.

Violators

would at least receive a social sanction to acknowledge
that they had less than common sense or decency.

Assuming

that most of us do indeed experience these feelings of
obligation towards posterity wh!ch I have postulated,
probably one of two basic reasons explains why we misbehave
at the present time, thOUgh the explanation

m~y

be a combination

of both.
Perhaps all that we need at this point is an appeal
to human reason.

One of the duties of the environmentalist

would be, then, to make sure that the pttblle 'is aware of the
real issues at stake.

With the facts of environmental

decay apparent the public would naturally realize the extent
of environmental crisis and promptly act, on

th~_

basis of

their moral convictions, so as to implement a solution.
All that is needed is a dissemination of the relevant findings
of science which Barry Commoner, a leading proponent of this
view, finds at the present to be insufficient:
For the public has little access to the necessary
scientific data. Much of the needed information
has been, and remains, wrapped in government and
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industrial secrecy. Unearthing the needed infor
mation and disseminating it to the public is, I
believe, the unique responsibility of the scientific
community. For to exercise its right of conscience,
the public must have the relevant scientific facts
in understandable terms. As the custodians of this
knowledge, we in the scientific community owe it to
our fellow citizens to help inform them about the
crisis in our environment. l
the environmental crisis is then, for this point of view,
primarily a problem of ignorance.

Certainly most books

written today on the environment are an attempt to clear
up Bome of this ignorance, taking the validity of my new
paradigm as an assumption.
Bevertheless, there are those who say that morality
and intellect alone cannot be counted on to guide men back
along the path of ecological wisdom.

The most widely

recognized proponent of such a view is undoubtedly Garrett
Hardin. who indeed has titled one of his recent books:
The Limits

~

Altruism.

Hardin states:

Moralists try to achieve desired ends by exhorting
people to be moral. They seldom 8~ed; and the
poorer the society (other things being equal) the
less their Buccess. 2
Hardin explains the reason for this fact:
When those who have not appreciated the nature of ' .
large groups innocently call for "social policy
institutions (to act) as agents of altruistic
opportunities ll they call for the impossible. In
large groups social policy institutions necessarily
must be guided by what I have called the Cardinal
Rule of Policy: Never ask a person to act against
his ~ self-interest.--rt-is Within-~limitations3
or-this rule that we must seek to create our future.
All of this leads to what Hardin calls lithe tragedy of the
cOmJDo.ns. 1l

In this theory he states that if the earth is
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finite, like a commons, and all of its inhabitants attempt,
uninhibited, to maximize their share of its resources, which
it is the natural procliVity

o~

man to do, scarcity and

eventual ruin for all is the only conceivable result.
Using the

anal~gy

of the herdsman he states:

Adding together the component partial utilities,
the rational herdsman concludes that the only
sensible course tor him to pursue is to add another
animal to his herd. And another ••• But this is the
conclusion reached by each and every rational
herdsman sharing a commons. Therein is the tragedy.
Each man is locked into a system that compels him
to increase his herd without limit-in a world that
is limited. Ruin is the destination toward which all
men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a
society that believes in the freedom of th~ commons.
Freedom in the commons brings ruin to all.
If we agree with Hardin, what we must look for is some sort
of external control upon the behavior0of the indiVidual,
some means whereby we are forced to take a cut in our share
of the commons when this is necessary.

We would need the

kind of faith that Frazier evidenees in B.F. Skinner's
Walden

~Jwhen

Burtls asks:

/tBut you yourself Beem to have unbounded faith
in human nature," I said.
II I
have none at all. ,. said Frazier bluntly, II if
you mean that men are naturally good or naturally
prepared to get along with each other. We have no
truck with phi~ophies of innate goodness-or evil.
either, for that matter. But we do have faith in
our power to change human behavior. We can make men
adequate for group living-to the satisfaction-o?
everybody.~

Both of these viewpoints, represented here by Commoner
and Hardin respectively, have, I think, some validity and
importance.

Certainly it would seem that Commoner must be
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right to some extent or"there is probably no hope of ever
solving an environmental crisis.

Unless we can count on

some public conscience, or the conscience of some of the
public, being drawn to action by an accurate understanding
of the relevant

data~and

an appreciation of the sort of

moral paradigm of which I have been speaking, how can we
hope to even begin the type of "ecological revolution" which
will undoubtedly be necessary to favorably resolve an
environmental crisis?

Clearly, on some level, there must

exist circumstances where we can reasonably expect: " a
person to act against his own self-interest."

Moral values

would be meaningless entities unless this were the case.
Nevertheless, in terms of large social groups I think I
have to agree, for the most part, with Hardin.

Certainly

a well informed public is more responsive to the deman&of
p06terit~

but even there the lure of personal gain is often

simply too strong.

We rationalize our participation in lithe

tragedy of the commons ll but inevitably the result will be
the same, ruin for all.

The short-term gain is simply too

enticing.
Clearly, then, the importance of the new technological
paradigm becomes a political as well as a moral question.
William Ophuls notes that some pin their hopes:
••• on the development of a collective conscience
in the form of a world view or religion that would
see man as the partner of nature rather than its
antagonist. This will undoubtedly be essential for
our survival in the long term, since without basic
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popular support even the most repressive regime
could hardly hope to succeed in protecting the
environment for long. However, mereechanges in
world view are not likely to be sufficient.
Political and social arrangements that implement
values are indispensable for turningirleals into
actuality.6
What we are dealing with here is a concept of "the common
good,n which may not maximize any individual's self-interest
but ensures that all do not fall into eventual ruin.

To

do this, that is to protect 'Ithe common good" against the
claims of individuals we must, as Robert Heibroner says:
••• discuss the problem of response in terms of
the flexibility of the social organizations that
mobilize human effort and that powerfully influence
human activity, in particular those massive Bocial
inBtrw.ents for shaping behavior we call nation
states and economic syste~7
We must, in effect, institutionalize morality, directing
human self-interest

80

that obligations to posterity are

fulfilled wi thout ever, _-:-.necessarily, appealing to conscience.
Indeed, Garrett Hardin, in

~

Limits to Altruism claims

that to ensure that future generations will have available
resources we must, in effect, institutionalize inequality:

It is futile to ask starving people to act against
their own self-interest as they see it, which is an
exclusively short-term self-interest. In a desperate
community long-term interests can be protected only
by institutional means: soldiers and policemen. These
agents will be reliable only if they are fed up to
some minimumllevel, higher than the average of the
starving population. In discounting the future a manls
personal discount rate 1s directly related to the
emptiness of his stomach. ThOBe who are the guardians
of future stores must be put in a favored position to
keep their personal discount rates low-that is, to
make it posgible for them to believe in, and protect,
the future.
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Such an attitude, though rationally expressed, seems to
strike against our traditional morality.

Yet if man is

truly incapable of acting morally, at least most of the
time, and we really do have an overriding obligation to
future generations, it will apparently be up to the
politicians to see that the appropriate sacrifices are
made.

Such an attitude frightens someone like Barry

Commoner who places a greater faith in mankind's ability
to manage its own moral affairs.

For instance, Commoner

states:
If a majority of the united states population
voluntarily practiced birth control adequate to
population stability, there would be no need for
coercion. The corollary is that coercion is
necessary only if a majortty £f the pO~ulatIon
refuses voluntarily to practice aoequa e bi~th
control. This meanBtha~th.e: ajo,rlty woUld need
to be coerced by the minority. This is, indeed,
political repression. 9
Certaihi~

someone like William Ophuls Bounds threatening to

us when he states:
Under conditions of ecological scarcity the individual,
possessing an inalienable right to pursue happiness
as he definies it and exercising his liberty in a
basieally laissez-faire system. will ineVitably produce
the ruin of the co'mmODS. Accordingly, the individualistic
basis of society. the coneept of inalienable rights,
the purely self-d,etinedi pursuit of happiness, liberty
as maximum freedom of action, and laissez faire itself
all become problematic. requiring major modi~ication
or perhaps even abandonment if we wish to avert
inexorible environmental degradation and eventual
extinction as a civilization. CertaiD1o' democracy as
we know it cannot conceivably survive.
Clearly, however, I think that Commoner expresses a naive
view of politics when he equates "coercion" with
repression. 1I

"p~litical

What Ophuls expresses in the second qUQtation
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is, I think, a clearcut example of the extreme to which
government might have to go, in the event of an environmental
crisis, simply to save mankind from itself.

If this is

"repression" the alternative may be far worse.

As Hardin

says':
The social arrangements that produce responsibility
are arrangements that create coercion,o! some sort.
Consider bank robbing. The man who takes money from
a bank acts as if the bank were a commons •• How do we
prevent such action? CertaDly not by trying to control
bis behavior sole~y b, a verbal appeal to his sense of
responsibility. Rather than rely on propaganda we
follow Frankel's lead and insist that a bank is not a
commons; we seek the definite social arrangements that
will keep tf from becoming a commons. That we thereby
infringe on the f~eedom of would-be-robbers we neither
deny nor regret. 11
Clearly it is the responsibility of the government to see
that the "common good" is always maintiined, and we grant to
the government the coercive force to do this.

Indeed, if

Commoner read Hardin a little more carefully I believe he
would find that Hardin

hard~y

contradicts his own viewscwhen

he states:
To many, the word coercion implies arbitrary decisions
of distant and irresponsible bureaucrats; but this is
not a necessary part of its meaning. The only kind of
coercion I recommend is mutual coercion, mutually 12
agreed upon by the majority of the pepple affected.
Surely this view is muchllmilder"than that expressed by some
of the more "pessimistic" writers such as Ophuls or Heilbroner.
What I am uncertain of is whether "mutual coercion
mutually agreed upon" provides a framework sufficient for
the implimentation of a technological program or plan
designed to favorably resolve an environmental crisis.
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If lithe common good ll includes the good of those not yet
born then I wonder whether the majority, even paying lip
service to this truth, has sufficient moral strength to
properly guide theip own behavior through political channels
so as not to violate the common good in this sense.

Perhaps

Ophuls and Heilbroner are correct when they warn that we
are heading for some form of " a uthoritarian" government.
This may be simply to protect our own future in a world of
increasing scarcitYjas Heilbroner explains:
••• if the stakes are not those of pleasure but of
survival, if the absQlute top priority becomes the
matter of self-preservation rather than the
preservation of the more agreeable aspects of our
self-indulgent culture, then I am inclined to
believe that the saving element in "human nature"
is likely to be that very capabiltty for identification
which, in its present pmlitical manifestations, also
poses some of the most dangerous challenges for the
immediate future. 1j
This in itself does not necessarily mean inevitable "political
repression," though the aanger is certainly there.

The

important question is, of course, for the purposes of this
paper, can we be certain that such a government will have
the interests of pasterity in mind?

Or would such a government

merely represent the efforts of the survivors struggle to
grab the last available resources before civilization
expired?

While the strict mandating of moral principles

through law may be the only means by which to protect posterlty!s
interests we must be aware of the question, as Hardin puts
it: ttWho shall watch the watchers themselves?1l14

Ideally.

those with the strongest moral sense, those who hold the new
paradigm in the highest light, ought to be the tulera.
this fact would be part of the paradigm itself.

Such a

Indeed
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person would pursue not only the common good of those living,
but the good of those yet to live.
this it is doomed toextinction.

If a culture can not do

Today the entire species

of mankind may similiarly be at stake.
Unfortunatel~ we

have learned from past experience

that the strong man is not always the wise man.

Nevertheless,

the fate of mankind probably rests with the rulers it chooses
now and in the very near future, for better or for worse.
As Heilbroner questions: "Is there hope for mankind?"
The pUEpose of this paper bas been to point out that unless
mankind puts its talents to better use, particularly in the
area of scientific achievement, guided by a new moral
paradigm, its chances of

avoidi~environmental catastrophe

and civilizational collapse are slim indeed.

If the

responslbili ty fo]:;:- our future lies with our rulers, how
best can we see that they accept and live by such a new
paradigm.

Probably only imp»oved education, at this point,

offers any hope out of our predicament.

As E.F. Schumacher

says:
••• the task of education would be, first and foremost,
the transmission of ideas of value, of what to do with
our lives. There is no doubt also the need to transmit
know-how but this must take second place. for it is
obvlou~8omewhat foolhardy to put great powers into
the hands of people without making sure that they have
a reasonable idea of what to do with them. At,ppesent,
there can be littme doubt that the whole of mankind 1s
in mortal danger, not because we are short o~ scientific
and technological know-how, but because we tend to use
it destructively, without wisdom. More ~ducation can
help us only if it produces more wisdom. 5
Unless some of this wisdom can filter through to our leaders
there probably is no hope for mankind.

For surely it is
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true, as Robert Matthews states:
Were the planners gods, they might solve this
problem of spatio-temporal scarcity by fiat, but
as men, they can best be kings. But they will be
kings! The qR8stion to be asked is whether we
stop short of making them philosophers as well.
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